{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2020-37268 exists.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2020-37268 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2020-37268 is a medium-severity vulnerability in rocq-prover rocq, published on 24 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2020-37268 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2020-37268 is a medium-severity vulnerability in rocq-prover rocq, published on 24 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2020-37268 exists.\n\nAffected product: rocq-prover rocq. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2020-37268/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2020-37268/index.md)","id":"CVE-2020-37268","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2020-37268/index.md","name":"CVE-2020-37268","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-5fm4-65fg-j439"],"analysis":{"component_type":"developer_tool","fix_type":"no_fix_stated","impacts":["security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":true,"product_category":"Coq proof assistant","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can bypass audit checks in Coq by hiding unsafe universe operations behind inlined parameters, allowing proofs of false statements to appear valid.","user_interaction":"required","vuln_class":"other"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"VulnCheck","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":6.8,"severity":"medium","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-778","name":"Insufficient Logging"}],"description":"Print Assumptions does not report that a definition was produced while universe checking was disabled when that definition reaches the caller through Parameter Inline in a module type. Applying a functor inlines the body of the parameter, and the inlining drops the record that the term was built under Unset Universe Checking, so the resulting constant carries no trace of the unsafe operation. A module implementation can therefore prove False using a universe inconsistency, expose it through an inlined parameter, and have Print Assumptions report the dependent proof as closed under the global context. Because Print Assumptions is the in-process audit used to confirm that a development rests on no unexpected assumptions, a dependency built this way passes that audit while proving arbitrary propositions. The standalone checker coqchk does reject the resulting compiled file. The project records this in dev/doc/critical-bugs.md under non-fixed bugs and rates the risk as moderate when coqchk is not used.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":"2026-08-23","github_poc":1,"max_poc_stars":0,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[{"date":"2026-08-23T23:28:18Z","kind":"github_poc","ref":"https://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-12155","stars":0,"title":"CVE-2020-37268 — Rocq/Coq Print Assumptions Omits Unsafe Universe Checking via Parameter Inline"}],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":null,"headline":"Coq and Rocq Prover Print Assumptions Omits Unsafe Universe Checking Inlined Through Parameter Inline","id":"CVE-2020-37268","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"other","year":"2020"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":5,"next":{"headline":"PocketMine-MP before 3.15.4 Denial of Service via InventoryTransaction","id":"CVE-2020-37277"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"Renovate 19.180.0 before 23.25.1 Token Leakage via Logs","id":"CVE-2020-37267"},"products":["rocq"],"published":"2026-08-24","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"},{"class":"open","licence":"CC0","name":"PoC-in-GitHub"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-10-26","vendors":["rocq-prover"]},"summary":"Attackers can bypass audit checks in Coq by hiding unsafe universe operations behind inlined parameters, allowing proofs of false statements to appear valid.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2020-37268/"}