{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2024-47179 exists.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2024-47179 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2024-47179 is a high-severity vulnerability in DIYgod RSSHub, published on 26 Sep 2024. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2024-47179 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2024-47179 is a high-severity vulnerability in DIYgod RSSHub, published on 26 Sep 2024. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2024-47179 exists.\n\nAffected product: DIYgod RSSHub. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2024-47179/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2024-47179/index.md)","id":"CVE-2024-47179","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2024-47179/index.md","name":"CVE-2024-47179","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-9mqc-fm24-h8cw"],"analysis":{"component_type":"developer_tool","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["code_execution","privilege_escalation"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"CI/CD workflow","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Attackers can poison CI artifacts to execute arbitrary code and take over the repository via unvalidated file extraction in the Docker test workflow.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"supply_chain"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"GitHub_M","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":8.8,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-20","name":"Improper Input Validation"}],"description":"RSSHub is an RSS network. Prior to commit 64e00e7, RSSHub's `docker-test-cont.yml` workflow is vulnerable to Artifact Poisoning, which could have lead to a full repository takeover. Downstream users of RSSHub are not vulnerable to this issue, and commit 64e00e7 fixed the underlying issue and made the repository no longer vulnerable. The `docker-test-cont.yml` workflow gets triggered when the `PR - Docker build test` workflow completes successfully. It then collects some information about the Pull Request that triggered the triggering workflow and set some labels depending on the PR body and sender. If the PR also contains a `routes` markdown block, it will set the `TEST_CONTINUE` environment variable to `true`. The workflow then downloads and extracts an artifact uploaded by the triggering workflow which is expected to contain a single `rsshub.tar.zst` file. However, prior to commit 64e00e7, it did not validate and the contents were extracted in the root of the workspace overriding any existing files. Since the contents of the artifact were not validated, it is possible for a malicious actor to send a Pull Request which uploads, not just the `rsshub.tar.zst` compressed docker image, but also a malicious `package.json` file with a script to run arbitrary code in the context of the privileged workflow. As of commit 64e00e7, this scenario has been addressed and the RSSHub repository is no longer vulnerable.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":"2026-09-02","github_poc":1,"max_poc_stars":0,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[{"date":"2026-09-02T12:24:46Z","kind":"github_poc","ref":"https://github.com/pvharmo2/gha-lab-d9fd584b12","stars":0,"title":"Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-47179 (GHSL-2024-178): artifact-poisoning pwn-request chain in RSSHub docker-test workflows (snapshot at 574d053)"}],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Supply chain in RSSHub","id":"CVE-2024-47179","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"supply_chain","year":"2024"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":8,"next":{"headline":"Shields.io Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Dynamic JSON/TOML/YAML badges","id":"CVE-2024-47180"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"basic-auth-connect's callback uses time unsafe string comparison","id":"CVE-2024-47178"},"products":["RSSHub"],"published":"2024-09-26","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"},{"class":"open","licence":"CC0","name":"PoC-in-GitHub"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"yes","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2024-10-02","vendors":["DIYgod"]},"summary":"Attackers can poison CI artifacts to execute arbitrary code and take over the repository via unvalidated file extraction in the Docker test workflow.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2024-47179/"}