{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2025-24888 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2025-24888 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2025-24888 is a high-severity path traversal vulnerability in freedomofpress securedrop-client, published on 13 Feb 2025. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2025-24888 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2025-24888 is a high-severity path traversal vulnerability in freedomofpress securedrop-client, published on 13 Feb 2025. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2025-24888 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: freedomofpress securedrop-client. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2025-24888/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2025-24888/index.md)","id":"CVE-2025-24888","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2025-24888/index.md","name":"CVE-2025-24888","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-6c3p-chq6-q3j2"],"analysis":{"component_type":"desktop_application","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["code_execution"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"SecureDrop Client","requires_auth":"none","summary":"A compromised SecureDrop Server can achieve code execution on the journalist's client VM via path traversal in reply downloads.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"path_traversal"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"GitHub_M","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":8.1,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-22","name":"Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory"}],"description":"The SecureDrop Client is a desktop application for journalists to communicate with sources and work with submissions on the SecureDrop Workstation. Prior to version 0.14.1, a malicious SecureDrop Server could obtain code execution on the SecureDrop Client virtual machine (`sd-app`). SecureDrop Server itself has multiple layers of built-in hardening, and is a dedicated physical machine exposed on the internet only via Tor hidden services for the Source and Journalist interfaces, and optionally via remote SSH access over another Tor hidden service. A newsroom's SecureDrop Workstation communicates only with its own dedicated SecureDrop Server.\n\nThe SecureDrop Client runs in a dedicated Qubes virtual machine, named `sd-app`, as part of the SecureDrop Workstation. The private OpenPGP key used to decrypt submissions and replies is stored in a separate virtual machine and never accessed directly. The vulnerability lies in the code responsible for downloading replies. The filename of the reply is obtained from the `Content-Disposition` HTTP header and used to write the encrypted reply on disk. Note that filenames are generated and sanitized server-side, and files are downloaded in an encrypted format, so a remote attacker who has not achieved server compromise, such as one posing as a source, could not craft the HTTP response necessary for this attack.\n\nWhile the filename is later checked to guard against path traversal before being moved into the Client’s data storage directory, the file has already been written to a potentially arbitrary location. In this case, `safe_move()` would detect the path traversal and fail, leaving the original downloaded file in the attacker-chosen directory. Code execution can be gained by writing an autostart file in `/home/user/.config/autostart/`.\n\nVersion 0.14.1 fixes the issue. As of time of publication, there is no known evidence of exploitation in the wild. This attack requires a previously compromised SecureDrop Server.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Path traversal in SecureDrop Client API.download_reply()","id":"CVE-2025-24888","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"path_traversal","year":"2025"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":6,"next":{"headline":"Path traversal in sd-log Qubes virtual machine","id":"CVE-2025-24889"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"OpenCTI bypass of protected attribute update","id":"CVE-2025-24887"},"products":["securedrop-client"],"published":"2025-02-13","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2025-02-13","vendors":["freedomofpress"]},"summary":"A compromised SecureDrop Server can achieve code execution on the journalist's client VM via path traversal in reply downloads.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2025-24888/"}