{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-104795 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-104795 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-104795 is a high-severity vulnerability in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19, published on 14 Oct 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-104795 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-104795 is a high-severity vulnerability in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19, published on 14 Oct 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-104795 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-104795/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-104795/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-104795","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-104795/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-104795","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-98f3-7g2j-289q"],"analysis":{"component_type":"container_or_infrastructure","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["privilege_escalation","code_execution"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"OpenShift Container Platform","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"A privileged container escape allows attackers to execute arbitrary code as root on the host by exploiting insufficient privilege drops in the insights-runtime-extractor.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"privilege_escalation"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"redhat","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":8.8,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-250","name":"Execution with Unnecessary Privileges"}],"description":"The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)\nthat scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a\ncontainer, the coordinator:\n\n1. **fork()s** a child process\n2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces\n3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root\n   filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)\n4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving\n   the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted\n   capability set**\n5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability\n   set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**\n6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with\n   `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from\n   `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**\n7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()`\n   — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount\n   namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**\n\nThe executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with\n`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor\ncontainer's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)\n\n**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers\njoin_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;\nchange_dir(current_dir);\nswitch_user(*process.uid)?;\nif *process.uid != 0 {\n    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()\n        .expect(\"Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints\");\n}\nfingerprint::run_fingerprints(\u0026config, out_dir, \u0026process);\n```\n\n```rust\n// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0\nfn switch_user(uid: u32) -\u003e Result\u003c(), ScannerError\u003e {\n    debug!(\"... Becoming user: {uid}\");\n    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)\n\n**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`\n\n```go\n// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]\nfunc GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {\n    out, err := exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()\n    if err != nil {\n        return \"\", err\n    }\n    return string(out), nil\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)\n\n**File:** `version_executable.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint\nreturn Some(vec![\n    fpr_kind_executable,\n    out_dir.to_string(),\n    String::from(\u0026process.command_line[0]),\n    String::from(\u0026version_executable.runtime_kind_name),\n]);\n```\n\n## Attack Pattern\n\n**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)\n**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet\n**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node\n\n**Attack sequence:**\n\n1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured\n   versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,\n   or contains `java`)\n2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious\n   executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root\n3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the\n   attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0\n4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user\n   namespace\n5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":null,"headline":"Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: container escape via privileged binary execution","id":"CVE-2026-104795","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"privilege_escalation","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":6,"next":{"headline":"Auth bypass in Advanced Form Integration — Connect Forms to 300+ Apps","id":"CVE-2026-104797"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"OWASP Coraza WAF: jsDecode Off-by-One in Octal Escape Handling Enables WAF Bypass","id":"CVE-2026-104774"},"products":["Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19","Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20","Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21","Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22"],"published":"2026-10-14","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-10-29","vendors":["Red Hat"]},"summary":"A privileged container escape allows attackers to execute arbitrary code as root on the host by exploiting insufficient privilege drops in the insights-runtime-extractor.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-104795/"}