{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including obsidian-tc.","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-115477 exists.","fix":"Upgrade obsidian-tc to 1.31.4 or later.","what":"CVE-2026-115477 is a high-severity vulnerability in The-40-Thieves obsidian-tc, published on 23 Oct 2026."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-115477 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-115477 is a high-severity vulnerability in The-40-Thieves obsidian-tc, published on 23 Oct 2026. \nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-115477 exists.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- obsidian-tc (npm): affected from 1.13.0; fixed in 1.31.4\n- obsidian-tc (npm): affected from 1.13.0; fixed in 1.31.4\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-115477/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-115477/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-115477","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-115477/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-115477","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":"GitHub_M","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":7.1,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-863","name":"Incorrect Authorization"},{"id":"CWE-285","name":"Improper Authorization"}],"description":"obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP","id":"CVE-2026-115477","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":6,"next":{"headline":"obsidian-tc: Memory-lifecycle tools overwrite unowned notes or partially commit lifecycle changes","id":"CVE-2026-115478"},"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["1.31.4"],"introduced":["1.13.0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"obsidian-tc","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["1.31.4"],"introduced":["1.13.0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"obsidian-tc","purl":"pkg:npm/obsidian-tc","source":"GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"}],"prev":{"headline":"baserCMS: Unauthenticated Stored XSS via Shortcode Expansion in Blog Comments","id":"CVE-2026-115457"},"products":["obsidian-tc"],"published":"2026-10-23","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-10-29","vendors":["The-40-Thieves"]},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-115477/"}