{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-11985 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-11985 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-11985 is a low-severity vulnerability in zephyrproject zephyr, published on 11 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-11985 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-11985 is a low-severity vulnerability in zephyrproject zephyr, published on 11 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-11985 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: zephyrproject zephyr. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-11985/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-11985/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-11985","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-11985/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-11985","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-qxr9-wh3c-hvgv"],"analysis":{"component_type":"operating_system","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["data_read"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":true,"product_category":"Zephyr RTOS","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"An attacker can read sensitive data from floating-point registers of other threads in Zephyr RTOS when FPU is enabled without register sharing.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"information_disclosure"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"zephyr","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":3.6,"severity":"low","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-200","name":"Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor"}],"description":"On the Zephyr ARM port, enabling the hardware FPU (CONFIG_FPU) forces the \"Floating point ABI\" choice, which defaults to CONFIG_FP_HARDABI. Both FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI permit the compiler to emit hardware FP instructions in any function, even code that never uses floating-point types. However, the callee-saved FP registers (s16-s31 / d8-d15) are only saved and restored across a context switch when CONFIG_FPU_SHARING is enabled (arch/arm/core/cortex_m/swap_helper.S and arch/arm/core/cortex_a_r/swap_helper.S), and prior to this fix selecting an ABI did not enable FPU register sharing, which defaults off.\n\nIn a build that enables the FPU with the default ABI but leaves CONFIG_FPU_SHARING disabled, the kernel preserves no callee-saved FP register state across thread switches. The documented precondition for this \"unshared\" mode — that only a single thread ever executes FP instructions — is silently violated because the compiler may generate FP instructions in every thread.\n\nUnder CONFIG_USERSPACE, where threads are mutually isolated, this becomes an information-disclosure boundary crossing: a victim thread can leave secret-derived values in s16-s31, and a co-resident unprivileged thread can read those registers directly (FP register access is not privilege-gated), recovering data left behind by another thread. Without userspace the same defect causes cross-thread FP state corruption (a correctness fault). The leak is bounded to the 16 callee-saved single-precision registers and is opportunistic, so impact is low.\n\nThe fix makes FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI select CONFIG_FPU_SHARING and tags every thread with K_FP_REGS at creation, so callee-saved FP state is always preserved across context switches whenever the compiler may emit FP instructions.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Cross-thread FPU register leak on ARM when FPU enabled without register sharing","id":"CVE-2026-11985","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"information_disclosure","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":2,"next":{"headline":"Keycloak Admin UI REST Extensions: bulk role-removal endpoints fail to perform granular permission checks","id":"CVE-2026-11986"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"Missing authorization in Ad Inserter – Ad Manager \u0026 AdSense Ads","id":"CVE-2026-11984"},"products":["zephyr"],"published":"2026-08-11","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-08-31","vendors":["zephyrproject"]},"summary":"An attacker can read sensitive data from floating-point registers of other threads in Zephyr RTOS when FPU is enabled without register sharing.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-11985/"}