{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-120307 in the wild and no public exploit code.","exposure":"","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-120307 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-120307 is a critical vulnerability in beam-cloud Beta9 worker, published on 1 Nov 2026."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-120307 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-120307 is a critical vulnerability in beam-cloud Beta9 worker, published on 1 Nov 2026. \nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-120307 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: beam-cloud Beta9 worker. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-120307/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-120307/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-120307","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-120307/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-120307","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-6h4h-qffc-3gfp"],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":"JFROG","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":9.9,"severity":"critical","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-59","name":"Improper Link Resolution Before File Access"},{"id":"CWE-23","name":"Relative Path Traversal"},{"id":"CWE-22","name":"Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory"}],"description":"The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths","id":"CVE-2026-120307","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":4,"next":{"headline":"Beta9 host filesystem exposure via volume path traversal","id":"CVE-2026-120308"},"nickname":null,"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"Beta9 build sandbox escape via chroot-only isolation","id":"CVE-2026-120306"},"products":["Beta9 worker"],"published":"2026-11-01","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-11-02","vendors":["beam-cloud"]},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-120307/"}