# CVE-2026-128091: AES key schedule not cleared by the TinyCrypt AES-CTR backend in MCUboot bootutil


- **Severity:** Low 2.0 (`CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`)
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Fix available:** No
- **Published:** 13 Nov 2026
- **Updated:** 17 Nov 2026
- **Also known as:** GHSA-wx3x-935q-6rcf

## What is CVE-2026-128091?

CVE-2026-128091 is a low-severity vulnerability in mcu-tools mcuboot, published on 13 Nov 2026. 

### Official description

When MCUboot is built with the TinyCrypt crypto backend (MCUBOOT_USE_TINYCRYPT), bootutil_aes_ctr_drop() in boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/aes_ctr_tinycrypt.h was an empty stub. The AES-CTR context for this backend is the fully expanded AES-128 key schedule (struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct). Generic code relies on this hook to release and clear key state, so with TinyCrypt nothing was cleared. The mbedTLS and PSA backends do free or destroy their key state here.

As a result, boot_state_clear(), which boot_go() calls before handing off to the application, left the image's AES content-encryption key schedule in the static boot_data state. This is the case after an encrypted upgrade in single-image builds, where boot_enc_zeroize() is not called. boot_decrypt_key() likewise left the ECIES-derived key-encryption key schedule on the stack. The affected build uses MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES with TinyCrypt, which is the default ECDSA and Ed25519 backend in the Zephyr port.

The first AES-128 round key equals the cipher key, so anyone who can read the leftover bootloader RAM after boot can recover the image content key and decrypt that encrypted image. That includes a physical attacker with debug or RAM access, or code later running on the device. This weakens image-encryption key confidentiality (and so the confidentiality of the encrypted image's plaintext). The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed, and image authenticity is not affected. The fix wipes the context with bootutil_wipe_memory().

Weakness: CWE-226 (Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse)

## Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-128091?


## How do I fix CVE-2026-128091?

No fix has been published for CVE-2026-128091 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.

## Is CVE-2026-128091 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-128091 in the wild and no public exploit code.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
Check this codebase for CVE-2026-128091 and fix it if it is affected.

What it is: CVE-2026-128091 is a low-severity vulnerability in mcu-tools mcuboot, published on 13 Nov 2026. 
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-128091 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Affected product: mcu-tools mcuboot. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.

Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-128091/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-128091/index.md)
```

## Sources

- CVE record: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-128091
- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128091
- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-128091

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-128091/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.
