{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including fickling. It affects 1 product.","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-14535 exists.","fix":"Upgrade fickling to 0.1.12 or later.","what":"CVE-2026-14535 is a high-severity unsafe deserialization vulnerability in trailofbits fickling, published on 4 Jul 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-14535 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-14535 is a high-severity unsafe deserialization vulnerability in trailofbits fickling, published on 4 Jul 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-14535 exists.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- fickling (PyPI): affected all versions; fixed in 0.1.12\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-14535/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-14535/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-14535","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-14535/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-14535","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429","GHSA-mgx3-9w7v-8674","PYSEC-2026-2150"],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["code_execution"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Python pickle security library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Shared mutable state disables the ML allowlist check, allowing arbitrary code execution via pickle deserialization of standard library modules.","user_interaction":"required","vuln_class":"deserialization"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"BombadilSystems","cpe":[{"product":"fickling","vendor":"trailofbits"}],"cvss":{"score":8.8,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-693","name":"Protection Mechanism Failure"}],"description":"In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.","ecosystems":["PyPI"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()","id":"CVE-2026-14535","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":"PyPI","product":null,"products":[],"type":"deserialization","year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":4,"next":{"headline":"Auth bypass in Server","id":"CVE-2026-14536"},"packages":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","fixed":["0.1.12"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"fickling","purl":"pkg:pypi/fickling","source":"PYSEC-2026-2150"}],"prev":{"headline":"Fickling check_safety() bypass via unlisted standard library modules (_posixsubprocess, site, atexit)","id":"CVE-2026-14534"},"products":["fickling"],"published":"2026-07-04","related":[{"cvss_score":8.9,"headline":"Fickling has a bypass via runpy.run_path() and runpy.run_module()","id":"CVE-2026-22606","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-01-10"},{"cvss_score":8.9,"headline":"Fickling Blocklist Bypass: cProfile.run()","id":"CVE-2026-22607","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-01-10"},{"cvss_score":8.9,"headline":"Fickling vulnerable to use of ctypes and pydoc gadget chain to bypass detection","id":"CVE-2026-22608","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-01-10"},{"cvss_score":8.9,"headline":"Fickling has Static Analysis Bypass via Incomplete Dangerous Module Blocklist","id":"CVE-2026-22609","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-01-10"},{"cvss_score":8.9,"headline":"Fickling vulnerable to detection bypass due to \"builtins\" blindness","id":"CVE-2026-22612","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-01-10"},{"cvss_score":8.8,"headline":"Fickling check_safety() bypass via unlisted standard library modules (_posixsubprocess, site, atexit)","id":"CVE-2026-14534","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-07-04"}],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"PyPA Advisory Database","prefix":"PYSEC"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"US public information, NVD API terms","name":"NVD"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-07-06","vendors":["trailofbits"]},"summary":"Shared mutable state disables the ML allowlist check, allowing arbitrary code execution via pickle deserialization of standard library modules.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-14535/"}