CVE-2026-18413 Out-of-bounds write in the NXP MCUX LPADC ADC driver due to missing adc_sequence buffer size validation

High 7.8 Published Updated

A missing buffer size check in the NXP MCUX LPADC driver allows out-of-bounds writes, enabling privilege escalation or code execution in kernel mode.

Exploited in the wild
Not known
Login needed
Any signed-in user
Attackable
Local or same network only
Victim action needed
Not needed
Fix
None listed

What is CVE-2026-18413?

CVE-2026-18413 is a high-severity memory corruption vulnerability in Zephyrproject Zephyr, published on 28 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.

Official description

The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The NXP MCUX LPADC driver did not honour that contract. mcux_lpadc_start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_mcux_lpadc.c performed no buffer-size check at all before assigning data->buffer = sequence->buffer. Each completed conversion then stores one 16-bit sample per enabled channel per sampling round through an unbounded *data->buffer++: in mcux_lpadc_isr() for interrupt-driven builds, and in mcux_lpadc_dma_callback() for DMA-driven builds on releases that have the DMA path. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, has its second sample written past the end of the buffer.

On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to an LPADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can request far more samples than its buffer can hold: up to channels * 65536 samples into a two-byte buffer, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence.

The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the ADC interrupt handler or the DMA completion callback), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer.

The fix calls the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c from mcux_lpadc_start_read(). The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started.

Weakness: CWE-787

Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-18413?

It affects 1 product.

Products include Zephyrproject Zephyr.

How do I fix CVE-2026-18413?

No fix has been published for CVE-2026-18413 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.

Upgrade to the fixed version. Memory-safe languages, compiler hardening and fuzzing prevent most new cases. More about Memory corruption.

Is CVE-2026-18413 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-18413 in the wild and no public exploit code.

All Zephyrproject Zephyr vulnerabilities

Sources

Also known as GHSA-7jqq-2g5q-hcrp.

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