{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-18748 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-18748 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-18748 is a low-severity vulnerability in zephyrproject zephyr, published on 21 Oct 2026."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-18748 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-18748 is a low-severity vulnerability in zephyrproject zephyr, published on 21 Oct 2026. \nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-18748 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: zephyrproject zephyr. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-18748/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-18748/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-18748","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-18748/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-18748","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-6qq5-25mp-x5rg"],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":"zephyr","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":3.5,"severity":"low","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-125","name":"Out-of-bounds Read"}],"description":"The Bluetooth Classic A2DP host stores a codec Information Element (IE) in struct bt_a2dp_codec_ie, a one-byte len field plus a fixed 8-byte codec_ie[] array. When an AVDTP peer sent a codec IE longer than 8 bytes, a2dp_process_config_ind() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/a2dp.c copied only the first 8 bytes but assigned the full, attacker-chosen length to len, and then persisted that inconsistent structure into the application's struct bt_a2dp_stream via stream-\u003ecodec_config. bt_a2dp_get_config_cb() and bt_a2dp_set_config_cb() had the same truncate-the-copy-but-keep-the-length pattern.\n\nEvery later consumer trusts len. In particular the responder for an incoming AVDTP GET_CONFIGURATION, a2dp_get_config_ind(), executes net_buf_add_mem(rsp_buf, \u0026ep-\u003estream-\u003ecodec_config.codec_ie[0], ep-\u003estream-\u003ecodec_config.len), so a paired BR/EDR peer that first sends a SET_CONFIGURATION carrying an oversized codec IE and then requests the configuration back causes the stack to read up to roughly 245 bytes past the end of the 8-byte array and transmit them in the response. codec_config is the last member of struct bt_a2dp_stream, so the read runs into memory adjacent to the application's stream object. The same inconsistency is also handed to the config_req(), reconfig_req() and get_config_rsp() application callbacks, where a natural memcpy() of len bytes performs a further out-of-bounds read.\n\nReaching the on-air disclosure requires CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC with CONFIG_BT_A2DP, an AVDTP peer that has completed pairing (the AVDTP L2CAP channel requires BT_SECURITY_L2), and a local endpoint registered for a non-SBC codec — BT_A2DP_MPEG1/BT_A2DP_MPEG2/BT_A2DP_ATRAC/BT_A2DP_VENDOR via BT_A2DP_EP_INIT() — because the SBC branch already pins the IE length to 4 bytes. The bt_a2dp_get_config_cb() response path has no such gate and hands the lying length to any application. There is no out-of-bounds write: the net_buf tailroom check bounds the destination, so the impact is limited to disclosure of a bounded region of adjacent RAM to the peer.\n\nThe fix replaces the hardcoded BT_A2DP_MAX_IE_LENGTH with the configurable CONFIG_BT_A2DP_CODEC_MAX_IE_LEN (default 8, range 4–253), sizes codec_ie[] from it, and rejects any received IE that exceeds it instead of silently truncating, so len can no longer exceed the number of valid bytes.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Out-of-bounds read in Bluetooth Classic A2DP codec information element handling","id":"CVE-2026-18748","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":2,"next":{"headline":"CVE-2026-18749","id":"CVE-2026-18749"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"Integer underflow of net_buf length in the MCUmgr serial (SMP over console) transport leads to out-of-bounds read","id":"CVE-2026-18747"},"products":["zephyr"],"published":"2026-10-21","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-10-23","vendors":["zephyrproject"]},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-18748/"}