{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including openclaw. It affects 1 product.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-26327 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.14 or later.","what":"CVE-2026-26327 is a high-severity vulnerability in Openclaw Openclaw, published on 19 Feb 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-26327 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-26327 is a high-severity vulnerability in Openclaw Openclaw, published on 19 Feb 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-26327 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.2.14\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.2.14\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-26327/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-26327/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-26327","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-26327/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-26327","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99"],"analysis":{"component_type":"mobile_application","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"OpenClaw AI assistant","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers on shared LANs can spoof discovery records to redirect clients and bypass TLS pinning, potentially stealing credentials.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"security_feature_bypass"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"GitHub_M","cpe":[{"product":"openclaw","vendor":"openclaw"}],"cvss":{"score":7.1,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-345","name":"Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity"}],"description":"OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection. As of time of publication, the iOS and Android apps are alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue. Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints. Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins. In iOS/Android, first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU) and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only. In Android, hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning).","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning","id":"CVE-2026-26327","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":"openclaw:openclaw","products":["openclaw:openclaw"],"type":"security_feature_bypass","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":3,"next":{"headline":"OpenClaw iMessage group allowlist authorization inherited DM pairing-store identities","id":"CVE-2026-26328"},"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.2.14"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.2.14"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":"pkg:npm/openclaw","source":"GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99"}],"prev":{"headline":"OpenClaw skills.status could leak secrets to operator.read clients","id":"CVE-2026-26326"},"products":["openclaw"],"published":"2026-02-19","related":[{"cvss_score":9.9,"headline":"Security feature bypass in OpenClaw","id":"CVE-2026-28363","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-02-27"},{"cvss_score":9.8,"headline":"Code injection in n/a","id":"CVE-2026-30741","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-03-11"},{"cvss_score":9.4,"headline":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.3.28 - Privilege Escalation via Missing Caller Scope Validation in Device Pair Approval","id":"CVE-2026-33579","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-03-31"},{"cvss_score":9.4,"headline":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.3.11 - Privilege Escalation via Unvalidated Scope in device.token.rotate","id":"CVE-2026-32922","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-03-29"},{"cvss_score":9.4,"headline":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.3.11 - Approval Bypass via Unrecognized Script Runners","id":"CVE-2026-32978","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-03-29"},{"cvss_score":9.4,"headline":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.3.12 - Scope Elevation in WebSocket Shared-Auth Connections","id":"CVE-2026-22172","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-03-20"},{"cvss_score":9.4,"headline":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.2.14 - Remote Code Execution via Node Invoke Approval Bypass","id":"CVE-2026-28466","kev_date_added":null,"published":"2026-03-05"}],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"US public information, NVD API terms","name":"NVD"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-02-20","vendors":["openclaw"]},"summary":"Attackers on shared LANs can spoof discovery records to redirect clients and bypass TLS pinning, potentially stealing credentials.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-26327/"}