CVE-2026-31415 ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
A local attacker can trigger a kernel panic via integer overflow in IPv6 sendmsg handling, causing denial of service.
- Exploited in the wild
- Not known
- Login needed
- Any signed-in user
- Attackable
- Local or same network only
- Victim action needed
- Not needed
- Fix
- Available
What is CVE-2026-31415?
CVE-2026-31415 is a medium-severity vulnerability in Linux kernel, published on 13 Apr 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.
Official description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
Yiming Qian reported : <quote> I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via `skb_under_panic()` (local DoS).
The core issue is a mismatch between:
- a 16-bit length accumulator (`struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen`, type `__u16`) and - a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (`opt->dst1opt`)
when multiple `IPV6_DSTOPTS` control messages (cmsgs) are provided.
- `include/net/ipv6.h`: - `struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen` is `__u16` (wrap possible). (lines 291-307, especially 298) - `net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl()`: - Accepts repeated `IPV6_DSTOPTS` and accumulates into `opt_flen` without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933) - `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data()`: - Uses `opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen` to compute header sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465) - `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb()`: - Calls `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` if `opt->opt_flen` is non-zero. (lines 1930-1934) - `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()` / `ipv6_push_exthdr()`: - Push size comes from `ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)` (based on the pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211)
1. `opt_flen` is a 16-bit accumulator:
- `include/net/ipv6.h:298` defines `__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */`.
2. `ip6_datagram_send_ctl()` accepts *repeated* `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs and increments `opt_flen` each time:
- In `net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933`, for `IPV6_DSTOPTS`: - It computes `len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);` - It checks `CAP_NET_RAW` using `ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922) - Then it does: - `opt->opt_flen += len;` (line 927) - `opt->dst1opt = hdr;` (line 928)
There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy `IPV6_2292DSTOPTS` path which rejects duplicates at `net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904`).
If enough large `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs are provided, `opt_flen` wraps while `dst1opt` still points to a large (2048-byte) destination-options header.
In the attached PoC (`poc.c`):
- 32 cmsgs with `hdrlen=255` => `len = (255+1)*8 = 2048` - 1 cmsg with `hdrlen=0` => `len = 8` - Total increment: `32*2048 + 8 = 65544`, so `(__u16)opt_flen == 8` - The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so `dst1opt` points to a 2048-byte header.
3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped `opt_flen`:
- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465`: - `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;`
With wrapped `opt_flen`, `headersize`/headroom decisions underestimate what will be pushed later.
4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from `dst1opt` and is not limited by wrapped `opt_flen`:
- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934`: - `if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);` - In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211`, `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` pushes `dst1opt` via `ipv6_push_exthdr()`. - In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184`, `ipv6_push_exthdr()` does: - `skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));` - `memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));`
With insufficient headroom, `skb_push()` underflows and triggers `skb_under_panic()` -> `BUG()`:
- `net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675` (`skb_push()` calls `skb_under_panic()`) - `net/core/skbuff.c:207-214` (`skb_panic()` ends in `BUG()`)
- The `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsg path requires `CAP_NET_RAW` in the target netns user namespace (`ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`). - Root (or any task with `CAP_NET_RAW`) can trigger this without user namespaces. - An unprivileged `uid=1000` user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespaced `CAP_NET_RAW` (the attached PoC does this).
- Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash). - ---truncated---
Weakness: CWE-617
Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-31415?
It affects 1 product.
Products include Linux kernel.
How do I fix CVE-2026-31415?
Apply the vendor's patch.
Is CVE-2026-31415 being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-31415 in the wild and no public exploit code.
Other vulnerabilities in Linux kernel
Sources
Also known as BELL-CVE-2026-31415, DEBIAN-CVE-2026-31415, GHSA-2rf4-5672-vqwm, ROOT-OS-DEBIAN-11-CVE-2026-31415, ROOT-OS-DEBIAN-12-CVE-2026-31415, ROOT-OS-DEBIAN-13-CVE-2026-31415 and 3 more.