CVE-2026-31607 usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()

Critical 9.8 Published Updated

A malicious USB/IP server can trigger a heap out-of-bounds write in the Linux kernel, potentially leading to code execution or privilege escalation.

Exploited in the wild
Not known
Login needed
Not needed
Attackable
Over the internet
Victim action needed
Not needed
Fix
Available

What is CVE-2026-31607?

CVE-2026-31607 is a critical memory corruption vulnerability in Linux kernel, published on 24 Apr 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.

Official description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()

When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response, usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the *original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.

A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.

KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69

The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)

The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point. On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.

This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the response value against the original allocation size.

Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves; this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit.

Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() safely return early.

Weakness: CWE-805, CWE-787

Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-31607?

It affects 1 product.

Products include Linux kernel.

How do I fix CVE-2026-31607?

Apply the vendor's patch.

Upgrade to the fixed version. Memory-safe languages, compiler hardening and fuzzing prevent most new cases. More about Memory corruption.

Is CVE-2026-31607 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-31607 in the wild and no public exploit code.

All Linux kernel vulnerabilities

Sources

Also known as AZL-83642, BELL-CVE-2026-31607, DEBIAN-CVE-2026-31607, GHSA-fcfj-3h7q-75mq, ROOT-OS-DEBIAN-11-CVE-2026-31607, ROOT-OS-DEBIAN-12-CVE-2026-31607 and 4 more.

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