{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-48086 exists.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-48086 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-48086 is a critical vulnerability in open-reception appointment-booking-software, published on 6 Aug 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-48086 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-48086 is a critical vulnerability in open-reception appointment-booking-software, published on 6 Aug 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-48086 exists.\n\nAffected product: open-reception appointment-booking-software. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-48086/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-48086/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-48086","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-48086/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-48086","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469"],"analysis":{"component_type":"web_application","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["privilege_escalation","data_read","data_modify"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Appointment booking software","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Tenant admins can self-promote to global administrators via a missing authorization check, gaining full control over all tenants and platform configuration.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"privilege_escalation"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"GitHub_M","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":9.9,"severity":"critical","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-269","name":"Improper Privilege Management"}],"description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the `GLOBAL_ADMIN` enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant's staff. No policy check enforces that \"only an existing GLOBAL_ADMIN may grant GLOBAL_ADMIN\", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"OpenReception: Tenant admin self-promotes to GLOBAL_ADMIN","id":"CVE-2026-48086","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"privilege_escalation","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":2,"next":{"headline":"OpenReception: WebAuthn passkey injection allows account takeover","id":"CVE-2026-48087"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"OpenReception has unauthenticated GLOBAL_ADMIN account creation post-bootstrap","id":"CVE-2026-48085"},"products":["appointment-booking-software"],"published":"2026-08-06","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-08-07","vendors":["open-reception"]},"summary":"Tenant admins can self-promote to global administrators via a missing authorization check, gaining full control over all tenants and platform configuration.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-48086/"}