{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-48764 exists.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-48764 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-48764 is a high-severity server-side request forgery vulnerability in baptisteArno typebot.io, published on 17 Jun 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-48764 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-48764 is a high-severity server-side request forgery vulnerability in baptisteArno typebot.io, published on 17 Jun 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-48764 exists.\n\nAffected product: baptisteArno typebot.io. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-48764/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-48764/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-48764","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-48764/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-48764","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-hgqq-whf5-mrrf"],"analysis":{"component_type":"web_application","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Chatbot builder tool","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attacker can bypass SSRF protections via DNS rebinding to access internal services and cloud metadata.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"ssrf"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"GitHub_M","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":8.2,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-918","name":"Server-Side Request Forgery"}],"description":"TypeBot is a chatbot builder tool. In versions prior to 3.17.2, SSRF validation is implemented by resolving a hostname once and checking whether the resolved IP belongs to a forbidden range allowing for DNS rebinding bypass. The root cause is a time-of-check to time-of-use gap in the SSRF guard. The validator resolves the hostname and approves it, but the later request path performs a fresh resolution and connects to whatever IP the hostname maps to at that moment. The actual outbound request is then performed later using the original hostname, without pinning the validated IP to the network connection. An attacker who can supply a URL to a public bot that performs a server-side HTTP Request block or server-side script fetch can use DNS rebinding to pass the initial validation and still force the server to connect to a private or metadata address during the real request. This enables server-side access to private network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and other internal HTTP targets that the validator was intended to block. The exact downstream impact depends on the reachable internal services. Concrete consequences include metadata disclosure, access to internal admin panels, credential theft from metadata services, and further compromise through internal-only HTTP interfaces. This issue has been fixed in version 3.17.2.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"TypeBot has SSRF in HTTP request and script fetch flows via DNS rebinding bypass","id":"CVE-2026-48764","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"ssrf","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":3,"next":{"headline":"TypeBot vulnerable to cross-workspace OAuth credential takeover in updateOAuthCredentials via missing object binding","id":"CVE-2026-48765"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"TypeBot has Arbitrary S3 Object Write in deprecated public upload endpoint via attacker-controlled filePath","id":"CVE-2026-48763"},"products":["typebot.io"],"published":"2026-06-17","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"yes","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-06-18","vendors":["baptisteArno"]},"summary":"Attacker can bypass SSRF protections via DNS rebinding to access internal services and cloud metadata.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-48764/"}