{"answers":{"affected":"4 open source packages ship an affected version, including zebra-state and zebrad.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-52738 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade zebra-state to 7.0.0 or later.","what":"CVE-2026-52738 is a medium-severity vulnerability in ZcashFoundation zebra, published on 18 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-52738 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-52738 is a medium-severity vulnerability in ZcashFoundation zebra, published on 18 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-52738 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- zebra-state (crates.io): affected all versions; fixed in 7.0.0\n- zebra-state (crates.io): affected all versions; fixed in 7.0.0\n- zebrad (crates.io): affected all versions; fixed in 4.5.0\n- zebrad (crates.io): affected all versions; fixed in 4.5.0\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-52738/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-52738/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-52738","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-52738/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-52738","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"],"analysis":{"component_type":"server_software","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["denial_of_service"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Zcash node software","requires_auth":"none","summary":"A specially crafted block causes a panic in Zebra nodes due to intermediate balance overflow, leading to permanent denial of service until patched.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"integer_overflow"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"GitHub_M","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":6.9,"severity":"medium","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-248","name":"Uncaught Exception"}],"description":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.","ecosystems":["crates.io"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks","id":"CVE-2026-52738","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":"crates.io","product":null,"products":[],"type":"integer_overflow","year":"2026"},"n_packages":4,"n_references":3,"next":{"headline":"ZEBRA: Repeated Non-Finalized Shielded Transaction Aborts Zebra Before Duplicate-Nullifier Rejection","id":"CVE-2026-52739"},"packages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["7.0.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"zebra-state","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"},{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["7.0.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"zebra-state","purl":"pkg:cargo/zebra-state","source":"GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"},{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["4.5.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"zebrad","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"},{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["4.5.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"zebrad","purl":"pkg:cargo/zebrad","source":"GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"}],"prev":{"headline":"ZEBRA: Sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block","id":"CVE-2026-52737"},"products":["zebra","zebra-state"],"published":"2026-08-18","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-08-19","vendors":["ZcashFoundation"]},"summary":"A specially crafted block causes a panic in Zebra nodes due to intermediate balance overflow, leading to permanent denial of service until patched.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-52738/"}