{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including @tak-ps/cloudtak.","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-55177 exists.","fix":"Upgrade @tak-ps/cloudtak to 13.10.0 or later.","what":"CVE-2026-55177 is a high-severity server-side request forgery vulnerability in dfpc-coe CloudTAK, published on 30 Sep 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-55177 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-55177 is a high-severity server-side request forgery vulnerability in dfpc-coe CloudTAK, published on 30 Sep 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-55177 exists.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- @tak-ps/cloudtak (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 13.10.0\n- @tak-ps/cloudtak (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 13.10.0\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-55177/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-55177/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-55177","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-55177/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-55177","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc"],"analysis":{"component_type":"web_application","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read","privilege_escalation"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"CloudTAK situational awareness","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Authenticated attackers can exploit unvalidated URL parameters in ESRI routes to perform Server-Side Request Forgery, reading internal cloud metadata and credentials.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"ssrf"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"GitHub_M","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":7.6,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-918","name":"Server-Side Request Forgery"}],"description":"CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: \u003cmessage\u003e. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in the /api/esri* routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard","id":"CVE-2026-55177","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"ssrf","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":2,"next":{"headline":"GeoLens: Cross-dataset authorization bypass discloses private dataset metadata, schema, sample values, table rows, and raster/vector tile data","id":"CVE-2026-55178"},"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["13.10.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"@tak-ps/cloudtak","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["13.10.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"@tak-ps/cloudtak","purl":"pkg:npm/%40tak-ps/cloudtak","source":"GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc"}],"prev":{"headline":"Soft Machine: Cross-tenant workspace API auth bypass via shared `CONTAINER_SHARED_SECRET` bearer token","id":"CVE-2026-55176"},"products":["CloudTAK"],"published":"2026-09-30","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-09-30","vendors":["dfpc-coe"]},"summary":"Authenticated attackers can exploit unvalidated URL parameters in ESRI routes to perform Server-Side Request Forgery, reading internal cloud metadata and credentials.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-55177/"}