# CVE-2026-68173: ublk: wait on ublk_dev_ready() instead of ub->completion

> A race condition in the Linux kernel ublk driver can cause requests to be stranded, leading to system hangs and denial of service during daemon recovery.

- **Severity:** High 7.1 (`CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`)
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Any signed-in user
- **Attackable:** Local or same network only
- **Victim action needed:** Not needed
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 10 Aug 2026
- **Updated:** 17 Aug 2026
- **Also known as:** BELL-CVE-2026-68173, DEBIAN-CVE-2026-68173, GHSA-mxh6-x24v-wwvm, UBUNTU-CVE-2026-68173

## What is CVE-2026-68173?

CVE-2026-68173 is a high-severity vulnerability in Linux, published on 10 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.

### Official description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ublk: wait on ublk_dev_ready() instead of ub->completion

ub->completion is only re-armed by a successful START_USER_RECOVERY. If
the ublk server sends END_USER_RECOVERY without one - e.g. its START
failed with -EBUSY and the error was ignored - the wait is satisfied by
the stale completion of the previous recovery cycle, and the device is
marked LIVE and the requeue list kicked while the FETCH stream is still
running and ubq->canceling is still set. The kick redispatches a
previously requeued request, __ublk_queue_rq_common() sees ->canceling
and parks it again via __ublk_abort_rq(), and after the last FETCH
clears ->canceling nothing ever kicks the requeue list again: the
request is stranded there while holding its tag. If it is the flush
machinery's flush_rq, every subsequent fsync piles up in uninterruptible
sleep and teardown hangs on tag draining. This matches a report of a
lost PREFLUSH with ext4 on top of ublk after daemon crash recovery.

ub->completion is an edge-triggered latch used as a proxy for the level
condition "every queue has fetched all I/O commands", which can regress
(F_BATCH's UNPREP, daemon death) and whose re-arm can be skipped. Drop
it and wait on the real condition instead: the new helper
ublk_wait_dev_ready_and_lock() waits on ublk_dev_ready() via
wait_var_event_interruptible(), woken from ublk_mark_io_ready(), then
re-checks it under ub->mutex, waiting again on regression, and returns
with the mutex held and readiness guaranteed.

Readiness becomes true in the same ub->mutex critical section that
clears the last queue's ->canceling, so END_USER_RECOVERY marks the
device LIVE and kicks the requeue list strictly after ->canceling
clears. The wait stays interruptible, so a server whose daemon died can
still be signalled out. For ublk_ctrl_start_dev() this replaces the
fail-fast -EINVAL on an F_BATCH ready->UNPREP regression with waiting
until the device is ready again.

## Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-68173?


## How do I fix CVE-2026-68173?

Apply the vendor's patch.

## Is CVE-2026-68173 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-68173 in the wild and no public exploit code.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
Check this codebase for CVE-2026-68173 and fix it if it is affected.

What it is: CVE-2026-68173 is a high-severity vulnerability in Linux, published on 10 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-68173 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Affected product: Linux. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.

Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-68173/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-68173/index.md)
```

## Sources

- CVE record: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68173
- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68173
- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-68173

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-68173/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.