CVE-2026-72222 sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback
A race condition in the Linux kernel's sunrpc TLS handshake allows use-after-free, potentially leading to code execution or denial of service on NFS servers.
- Exploited in the wild
- Not known
- Login needed
- Not needed
- Attackable
- Over the internet
- Victim action needed
- Not needed
- Fix
- Available
What is CVE-2026-72222?
CVE-2026-72222 is a critical use after free vulnerability in Linux, published on 15 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
Official description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback
svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of().
Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain, returns, and svc_handle_xprt() calls svc_xprt_received(), which clears XPT_BUSY and can drop the last reference. A concurrent close then runs svc_sock_free() while svc_tcp_handshake_done() is still updating xpt_flags and walking svsk->sk_handshake_done.
The corruption surfaces as set_bit/clear_bit RMW into the freed xpt_flags slab slot and as complete_all() walking and writing the freed wait_queue_head_t list embedded in sk_handshake_done -- a slab-corruption primitive, not a benign read. The path is reachable on any TLS-enabled NFS server whenever a connection close overlaps the tlshd downcall delivery window; the interruptible wait means signal delivery suffices, not just SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO expiry.
Take svc_xprt_get(xprt) immediately before tls_server_hello_x509() so the in-flight callback owns its own reference. Release it on the two edges where the callback is guaranteed not to fire -- submission failure from tls_server_hello_x509() and a successful tls_handshake_cancel() -- and at the tail of svc_tcp_handshake_done() after complete_all().
[cel: rewrote commit message to describe the actual change]
Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-72222?
How do I fix CVE-2026-72222?
Apply the vendor's patch.
Upgrade to the fixed version. These bugs are found with fuzzing and sanitisers and avoided by memory-safe languages. More about Use after free.
Is CVE-2026-72222 being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-72222 in the wild and no public exploit code.
Sources
Also known as BELL-CVE-2026-72222, DEBIAN-CVE-2026-72222, GHSA-6mfm-2hg9-7gww, UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72222.