{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-74430 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Apply the vendor's patch.","what":"CVE-2026-74430 is a high-severity vulnerability in Linux, published on 15 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-74430 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-74430 is a high-severity vulnerability in Linux, published on 15 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-74430 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: Linux. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-74430/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-74430/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-74430","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-74430/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-74430","record":{"aliases":["BELL-CVE-2026-74430","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-74430","GHSA-px3f-ghhp-7f3w","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-74430"],"analysis":{"component_type":"kernel","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["denial_of_service"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Linux kernel","requires_auth":"none","summary":"A remote attacker can cause a kernel crash by sending a forged ACKALL packet to a new service call, leading to a null-pointer dereference.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"null_dereference"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"Linux","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":7.5,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[],"description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling\n\nrxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the\ncall is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.\nA forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in\nRXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.\n\nIn that state call-\u003etx_top is zero and call-\u003etx_queue is NULL, so\nrxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a\nnull-pointer dereference.\n\nFix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:\n\n (1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates\n     that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as\n     yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything\n     has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the\n     stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may\n     still happen).\n\n     The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned\n     a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the\n     first packet is transmitted.\n\n     RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate\n     that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the\n     reply to be received.\n\n (2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks\n     that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx\n     buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than\n     AWAIT_REPLY.  ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong\n     state.\n\n     Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check\n     to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this.\n\n (3) Make the ACKALL handler use call-\u003etx_transmitted rather than\n     call-\u003etx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number\n     transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition.\n\nThanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL\npacket[1].","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling","id":"CVE-2026-74430","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"null_dereference","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":3,"next":{"headline":"rxrpc: Fix potential infinite loop in rxrpc_recvmsg()","id":"CVE-2026-74431"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"rxrpc: Fix the reception of a reply packet before data transmission","id":"CVE-2026-74429"},"products":["Linux"],"published":"2026-08-15","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-08-17","vendors":["Linux"]},"summary":"A remote attacker can cause a kernel crash by sending a forged ACKALL packet to a new service call, leading to a null-pointer dereference.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-74430/"}