{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-78165 exists.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-78165 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-78165 is a high-severity unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Apache Camel, published on 19 Oct 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-78165 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-78165 is a high-severity unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Apache Camel, published on 19 Oct 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-78165 exists.\n\nAffected product: Apache Camel. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-78165/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-78165/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-78165","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-78165/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-78165","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-8p5r-xpxr-x2x7"],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["code_execution"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Apache Camel integration library","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Attackers can execute arbitrary code by publishing malicious serialized data to Redis channels subscribed by Apache Camel Spring Redis components.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"deserialization"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"apache","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":8.8,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-502","name":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data"}],"description":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Spring Redis component.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\nRedisConfiguration.getSerializer lazily built a bare JdkSerializationRedisSerializer whenever no serializer option was configured, and that instance was used for every read the component performs. Spring's implementation delegates through DeserializingConverter to DefaultDeserializer, which reads the bytes with a ConfigurableObjectInputStream and installs no java.io.ObjectInputFilter on the stream, so an arbitrary serialized class graph was materialised and its readObject method executed. RedisConsumer.setBody applied that serializer to the raw bytes of every message published to the subscribed channels, before the Exchange was constructed and therefore before any route logic could inspect the message, so an actor able to issue PUBLISH on a subscribed channel reached the deserialization sink directly. The same default serializer backed the RedisTemplate built by RedisConfiguration.createDefaultTemplate, so the producer read commands GET, HGET, HGETALL and HVALS deserialized whatever was stored in the Redis keyspace, and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository shared that template. Configuring a custom redisTemplate did not close the consumer path, because RedisConsumer.setBody reads getSerializer directly rather than the serializer attached to the template, so a deployment that had wired a String serializer into its own template remained exposed on the consumer side unless it also set the serializer option. The component never constructed a java.io.ObjectInputStream itself, which is why earlier passes over the Camel codebase for unfiltered Java deserialization did not reach it. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the component, first released in 2.11.0, and was unchanged until this fix.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":"2026-10-16","github_poc":1,"max_poc_stars":0,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[{"date":"2026-10-16T11:18:39Z","kind":"github_poc","ref":"https://github.com/oscerd/CVE-2026-78165","stars":0,"title":"Reproducer for CVE-2026-78165 (Apache Camel camel-spring-redis): default JdkSerializationRedisSerializer deserializes Redis PUBLISH payloads with no ObjectInputFilter (RCE) — Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus"}],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Apache Camel: Camel-Spring-Redis Unfiltered Java Deserialization of Redis Payloads","id":"CVE-2026-78165","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"deserialization","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":6,"next":{"headline":"provectus kafka-ui Groovy Code MessagesController.java executeSmartFilterTest code injection","id":"CVE-2026-78166"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"Apache Camel: HTTP producers resolve property placeholders in message-supplied URI override headers","id":"CVE-2026-78164"},"products":["Apache Camel"],"published":"2026-10-19","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"},{"class":"open","licence":"CC0","name":"PoC-in-GitHub"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-10-20","vendors":["Apache Software Foundation"]},"summary":"Attackers can execute arbitrary code by publishing malicious serialized data to Redis channels subscribed by Apache Camel Spring Redis components.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-78165/"}