{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-79982 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-79982 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-79982 is a high-severity vulnerability in zephyrproject zephyr, published on 23 Oct 2026."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-79982 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-79982 is a high-severity vulnerability in zephyrproject zephyr, published on 23 Oct 2026. \nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-79982 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: zephyrproject zephyr. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-79982/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-79982/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-79982","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-79982/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-79982","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-w5px-w97v-c3hj","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-79982"],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":"zephyr","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":8.8,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-787","name":"Out-of-bounds Write"}],"description":"The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf-\u003edata, bt_buf-\u003elen) with no length check. HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool.\n\nThe device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air. With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE. In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization.\n\nBecause net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution. Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool at the endpoint packet size, which is already bounds-checked during reassembly.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HC","id":"CVE-2026-79982","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":2,"next":{"headline":"Path traversal in Apache Camel","id":"CVE-2026-79983"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"DNS resolver reuses a single UDP source port for all queries, easing off-path answer spoofing","id":"CVE-2026-79981"},"products":["zephyr"],"published":"2026-10-23","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-10-23","vendors":["zephyrproject"]},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-79982/"}