# CVE-2026-80527: ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted > A race condition in the Linux kernel Ceph client can cause a reader to hang indefinitely, resulting in a denial of service. - **Severity:** High 7.5 (`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`) - **Exploited in the wild:** Not known - **Login needed:** Not needed - **Attackable:** Over the internet - **Victim action needed:** Not needed - **Fix available:** Yes - **Published:** 26 Aug 2026 - **Updated:** 16 Oct 2026 - **Also known as:** AZL-97677, BELL-CVE-2026-80527, DEBIAN-CVE-2026-80527, GHSA-q6xj-rvvg-h9r2, UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80527 ## What is CVE-2026-80527? CVE-2026-80527 is a high-severity denial of service vulnerability in Linux, published on 26 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim. ### Official description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD` from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`. If the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS after `cap->mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read caps. In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need <= mds_wanted` and returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`. If the cap update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after `cap->mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to wake it up. The ordering issue is that `cap->mds_wanted` is updated in __prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually queued for send. That makes one field serve two different meanings at once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS already knows it wants. A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS. However, simply moving the `cap->mds_wanted assignment` later would not be sufficient: queueing the message in the messenger does not guarantee that the MDS processed that specific wanted set, and reconnect or message loss can still invalidate that assumption. Fixing that properly would require a larger rework of the cap state machine. To allow simpler backports to stable kernels, this patch implements a simpler workaround: - stop waiting forever in __ceph_get_caps(); after a bounded wait, fall back to the renew path - make ceph_renew_caps() issue a synchronous `OPEN` request whenever the inode still does not actually hold the wanted caps, instead of only calling ceph_check_caps() The extra issued-vs-wanted check in ceph_renew_caps() is necessary because the previous test only checked whether the inode still had any real caps at all. That is not enough after revocation: the client can still hold something like `pLs` and yet be missing `FILE_RD` completely. In that case, falling back to ceph_check_caps() is not sufficient, because it still trusts `cap->mds_wanted` and may resend nothing. By requiring `(issued & wanted) == wanted` before taking the asynchronous path, the code only uses ceph_check_caps() when the `wanted caps` are already actually issued. Otherwise, it sends the synchronous `OPEN` renew. This preserves the existing asynchronous fast path when the wanted caps are already issued, avoids changing cap-state semantics, and fixes the hang by guaranteeing that a stalled waiter eventually retries through a path that does not rely on the stale `mds_wanted` state. [ idryomov: move CEPH_GET_CAPS_WAIT_TIMEOUT from libceph.h to mds_client.h, formatting ] ## Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-80527? ## How do I fix CVE-2026-80527? Apply the vendor's patch. ## Is CVE-2026-80527 being exploited? There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-80527 in the wild and no public exploit code. ## Fix prompt for AI coding agents ```text Check this codebase for CVE-2026-80527 and fix it if it is affected. What it is: CVE-2026-80527 is a high-severity denial of service vulnerability in Linux, published on 26 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim. Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-80527 in the wild and no public exploit code. Affected product: Linux. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page. Task: 1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies. 2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it. 3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead. 4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why. 5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing. Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-80527/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-80527/index.md) ``` ## Sources - CVE record: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80527 - NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80527 - OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-80527 --- From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-80527/ Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.