{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including ash_graphql.","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-82367 exists.","fix":"Upgrade ash_graphql to 1.11.0 or later.","what":"CVE-2026-82367 is a low-severity vulnerability in ash-project ash_graphql, published on 30 Aug 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-82367 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-82367 is a low-severity vulnerability in ash-project ash_graphql, published on 30 Aug 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-82367 exists.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- ash_graphql (Hex): affected from 1.4.0; fixed in 1.11.0\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82367/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82367/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-82367","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82367/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-82367","record":{"aliases":["EEF-CVE-2026-82367","GHSA-wm4m-cjmc-5v8c"],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":true,"product_category":"Elixir GraphQL library","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Attackers can read other users' subscription data due to a race condition in AshGraphql's batcher when using synchronous publishing modes.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"information_disclosure"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"EEF","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":2.3,"severity":"low","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-488","name":"Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session"}],"description":"Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session vulnerability in ash-project ash_graphql can deliver one subscription's resolved records to a different subscriber's topic.\n\nAshGraphql.Subscription.Batcher.do_send/5 reads the resolved batch from the process dictionary via Process.get(:batch_resolved) and then unconditionally deletes it. That is sound only inside a task the library owns. On the :backpressure_sync and :noproc fallbacks do_send/5 runs inline in the publishing caller's process, so if a resolver inside an outer do_send/5 triggers another synchronous Ash notification, the inner call finds the outer run's value still under :batch_resolved, adopts it as its own result, and publishes it to the inner topic, a different subscription document with a different actor and tenant. It then deletes the key, so the outer run publishes nothing. The key is not namespaced by run, so records cannot be told apart. The fix saves, clears, and restores :batch_resolved around each run.\n\nThis issue affects ash_graphql: from 1.4.0 before 1.11.0.","ecosystems":["Hex"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Re-entrant synchronous publish in AshGraphql subscription batcher delivers one subscriber's records to another's topic","id":"CVE-2026-82367","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":"Hex","product":null,"products":[],"type":"information_disclosure","year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":4,"next":{"headline":"Missing authorization in SANnav","id":"CVE-2026-82368"},"packages":[{"ecosystem":"Hex","fixed":["1.11.0"],"introduced":["1.4.0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"ash_graphql","purl":"pkg:hex/ash_graphql","source":"EEF-CVE-2026-82367"}],"prev":{"headline":"macrozheng mall Order Submission submit race condition","id":"CVE-2026-82364"},"products":["ash_graphql"],"published":"2026-08-30","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"Erlang Ecosystem Foundation","prefix":"EEF"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-09-01","vendors":["ash-project"]},"summary":"Attackers can read other users' subscription data due to a race condition in AshGraphql's batcher when using synchronous publishing modes.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82367/"}