{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-82428 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-82428 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-82428 is a high-severity path traversal vulnerability in Apache Storm Client, published on 14 Sep 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-82428 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-82428 is a high-severity path traversal vulnerability in Apache Storm Client, published on 14 Sep 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-82428 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: Apache Storm Client. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82428/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82428/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-82428","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82428/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-82428","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-5f32-8637-hcrg"],"analysis":{"component_type":"server_software","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["code_execution","privilege_escalation"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":true,"product_category":"Apache Storm Client","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Attackers can substitute dependency jars via predictable blob keys, leading to code execution in other tenants' topologies in multi-tenant Apache Storm clusters.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"path_traversal"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"apache","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":8.8,"severity":"high","source":"cisa-adp","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-22","name":"Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory"}],"description":"Description\n\nDependency artifacts uploaded with `storm jar --artifacts` were stored under a blob key derived only from\nthe Maven coordinate, for example `dep---.jar`. The key was therefore identical\nfor every user of the cluster and predictable in advance. When the blob already existed, the uploader\ncaught `KeyAlreadyExistsException` and silently reused it, with no check that the existing blob's content\nor owner matched the artifact the submitter had resolved.\n\nA user who uploaded a blob under such a key first therefore controlled the bytes that every later submitter\nof the same coordinate would receive on the worker classpath, resulting in code execution inside another\ntenant's topology.\n\nThis affects deployments where more than one principal may create blobs and where the `--artifacts`\ndependency feature is used.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where each uploaded artifact receives a key carrying a freshly generated UUID and a\npre-existing blob is no longer silently reused.\n\nNote that the corrected key generation is on the SUBMITTING CLIENT, so upgrading the cluster alone does not\nclose this; every client that runs `storm jar --artifacts` must also be upgraded. Operators should audit\nexisting `dep-` blobs for unexpected owners before upgrading. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should\navoid the `--artifacts` mechanism in multi-tenant clusters and distribute dependencies inside the topology\njar instead.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":null,"headline":"Apache Storm Client: Cross-Tenant Dependency Jar Substitution via Predictable Blob Keys","id":"CVE-2026-82428","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"path_traversal","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":1,"next":{"headline":"Apache Storm Worker Launcher: Local Privilege Escalation to Root via a Time-of-Check Race in the Worker Launcher","id":"CVE-2026-82429"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"Apache Storm Nimbus: Path Traversal as the Supervisor User via Unsanitised Blobstore Map Local Name","id":"CVE-2026-82427"},"products":["Apache Storm Client"],"published":"2026-09-14","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-09-14","vendors":["Apache Software Foundation"]},"summary":"Attackers can substitute dependency jars via predictable blob keys, leading to code execution in other tenants' topologies in multi-tenant Apache Storm clusters.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82428/"}