{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including ash_phoenix.","exploited":"It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-82726 exists.","fix":"Upgrade ash_phoenix to 2.3.25 or later.","what":"CVE-2026-82726 is a medium-severity vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix, published on 31 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-82726 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-82726 is a medium-severity vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix, published on 31 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: It is not confirmed as exploited in the wild, but public exploit code for CVE-2026-82726 exists.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- ash_phoenix (Hex): affected from 2.1.26; fixed in 2.3.25\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82726/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82726/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-82726","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82726/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-82726","record":{"aliases":["EEF-CVE-2026-82726","GHSA-rpf8-q9jh-qxrr"],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["security_bypass","data_read"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Elixir Ash Phoenix library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can bypass tenant isolation by sending crafted Host headers, potentially accessing unauthorized tenant data or degrading service.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"security_feature_bypass"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"EEF","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":6.3,"severity":"medium","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-625","name":"Permissive Regular Expression"},{"id":"CWE-178","name":"Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity"}],"description":"Permissive Regular Expression vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets a remote client select the tenant an Ash application uses, or degrade the request, by sending a crafted Host header.\n\nAshPhoenix.Helpers.get_subdomain/2 stripped the root domain with String.replace(host, ~r/.?#{root_host}/, \"\"). The root host was interpolated raw, so each . became a wildcard and any metacharacter a pattern, and the replace was global and unanchored, so a match was removed from anywhere in the string. With root_host example.com, Host: foo.exampleXcom.attacker.net returned the tenant foo.attacker.net. A metacharacter-bearing or nil root host degraded the pattern or raised on every request. The comparison was also case-sensitive, so TENANT.EXAMPLE.COM and EXAMPLE.COM slipped past the root-host allowlist. conn.host comes from the client Host header. The fix matches the root host case-insensitively and only as an exact trailing suffix.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25.","ecosystems":["Hex"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"weaponised"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"AshPhoenix get_subdomain maps a crafted or differently-cased Host header to an arbitrary tenant","id":"CVE-2026-82726","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":"Hex","product":null,"products":[],"type":"security_feature_bypass","year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":4,"next":{"headline":"AshPhoenix Form.Auto leaks submitted params in an unknown _union_type error message","id":"CVE-2026-82727"},"packages":[{"ecosystem":"Hex","fixed":["2.3.25"],"introduced":["2.1.26"],"last_affected":[],"package":"ash_phoenix","purl":"pkg:hex/ash_phoenix","source":"EEF-CVE-2026-82726"}],"prev":{"headline":"AshPhoenix FilterForm allows filtering across non-public relationships, disclosing private related data","id":"CVE-2026-82725"},"products":["ash_phoenix"],"published":"2026-08-31","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"Erlang Ecosystem Foundation","prefix":"EEF"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"poc","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-08-31","vendors":["ash-project"]},"summary":"Attackers can bypass tenant isolation by sending crafted Host headers, potentially accessing unauthorized tenant data or degrading service.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-82726/"}