# CVE-2026-89625: HID: sony: fix UAF of ghl_poke_timer / ghl_urb at driver unbind

> A use-after-free in the Linux kernel HID sony driver allows local attackers to execute code or escalate privileges via a race condition during device unbind.

- **Severity:** Not scored
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Not needed
- **Attackable:** Local or same network only
- **Victim action needed:** Not needed
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 11 Sep 2026
- **Updated:** 21 Oct 2026
- **Also known as:** AZL-100494, BELL-CVE-2026-89625, DEBIAN-CVE-2026-89625, GHSA-h5c7-p475-c26r, UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89625

## What is CVE-2026-89625?

CVE-2026-89625 is an use after free vulnerability in Linux, published on 11 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.

### Official description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: sony: fix UAF of ghl_poke_timer / ghl_urb at driver unbind

For GHL (Guitar Hero Live) dongles, sony_probe() arms a periodic timer:
ghl_magic_poke() (the timer callback) submits sc->ghl_urb, and the URB
completion ghl_magic_poke_cb() re-arms the timer with mod_timer().

sony_remove() drained the timer with timer_delete_sync() and then freed
the URB with usb_free_urb():

	timer_delete_sync(&sc->ghl_poke_timer);
	usb_free_urb(sc->ghl_urb);

timer_delete_sync() does not block re-arming, and while the URB is in
flight the timer is not pending, so the sync delete is a no-op. A URB
completion that runs after the delete re-arms the timer, and usb_free_urb()
only drops a reference -- it does not kill an in-flight URB. sc is
allocated with devm_kzalloc() and freed once sony_remove() returns, so the
re-armed ghl_poke_timer (embedded in sc) then fires on freed memory, a
use-after-free from timer softirq. This is a disconnect/rmmod race.

Poison the URB first, then shut the timer down, before freeing the URB.
usb_poison_urb() kills any in-flight URB and permanently rejects further
submissions, so a poke timer that is still pending cannot re-submit the
URB from ghl_magic_poke() in the window before timer_shutdown_sync() runs.
usb_kill_urb() would not suffice: it only cancels the in-flight URB and
leaves it submittable once it returns, so the pending timer could
re-submit it and put a fresh URB in flight over the freed sc.
timer_shutdown_sync() then drains any last callback and blocks re-arming.
The probe error path is unaffected: it is only reached before the timer
is armed.

Reproduced under KASAN on next-20260710 via dummy_hcd + raw-gadget
emulation of the GHL PS4 dongle (VID 0x1430 / PID 0x07bb): hid-sony binds
and arms the poke timer, the poke URB is held in flight, the driver is
unbound (freeing sc), then the URB is released. The completion re-arms the
timer on the freed sc, and the re-armed timer fires ~8 s later:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ghl_magic_poke+0x98/0xb0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810b02fd50 by task swapper/0/0
   ghl_magic_poke+0x98/0xb0
   call_timer_fn+0x35/0x2b0
   __run_timers+0x69c/0x9a0
   run_timer_softirq+0x173/0x2a0
  Allocated by task 169:  sony_probe
  Freed by task 338:      devres_release_group <- hid_device_remove (sony_remove)

Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis.

## Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-89625?


## How do I fix CVE-2026-89625?

Apply the vendor's patch.

## Is CVE-2026-89625 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-89625 in the wild and no public exploit code.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
Check this codebase for CVE-2026-89625 and fix it if it is affected.

What it is: CVE-2026-89625 is an use after free vulnerability in Linux, published on 11 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-89625 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Affected product: Linux. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.

Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-89625/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-89625/index.md)
```

## Sources

- CVE record: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89625
- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89625
- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-89625

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-89625/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.