{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-90264 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Apply the vendor's patch.","what":"CVE-2026-90264 is a vulnerability in Linux, published on 17 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-90264 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-90264 is a vulnerability in Linux, published on 17 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-90264 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: Linux. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-90264/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-90264/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-90264","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-90264/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-90264","record":{"aliases":["AZL-102291","BELL-CVE-2026-90264","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90264","GHSA-wxhm-52wr-87x4","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90264"],"analysis":{"component_type":"kernel","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["denial_of_service"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Linux kernel filesystem","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"A race condition in the Linux kernel's Btrfs filesystem allows local attackers to trigger a kernel panic via concurrent direct and buffered writes.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"race_condition"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"Linux","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races\n\n[BUG]\nSyzbot reported a bug that there can be conflicting OEs for the same\nrange:\n\n  BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object alrea[  179.162726][ T6897] BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object already exists)\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:264!\n  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026\n  RIP: 0010:btrfs_alloc_ordered_extent+0x943/0xad0\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   cow_file_range+0x744/0x12a0\n   fallback_to_cow+0x5ea/0xa00\n   run_delalloc_nocow+0x110c/0x17a0\n   btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0xbe4/0x1c20\n   writepage_delalloc+0x104d/0x1ba0\n   btrfs_writepages+0x1667/0x28b0\n   do_writepages+0x338/0x560\n   filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x1f2/0x300\n   btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x54/0xf0\n   btrfs_direct_write+0x6a0/0xc30\n   btrfs_do_write_iter+0x329/0x790\n   do_iter_readv_writev+0x624/0x8d0\n   vfs_writev+0x34c/0x990\n   __se_sys_pwritev2+0x17a/0x2a0\n   do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\n[CAUSE]\nSince commit ff66fe666233 (\"btrfs: fix incorrect buffered IO fallback\nfor append direct writes\"), if the direct IO finished short, we will\nrevert the isize back to the original one, so that append writes can be\nrespected during the buffered fallback.\n\nNormally we rely on lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() function during\nbuffered writeback to wait for any existing ordered extents.\n\nBut that ordered extent waiting only happens if the start_pos is inside\nthe isize.\nSince we have reverted the isize during failed direct IO, we will not\nwait for any ordered extents.\n\nThis means we can have a race where the direct IO OE is still in the\ntree, finished but not yet removed, then we're inserting the OE for the\nbuffered write, causing the above crash.\n\n[FIX]\nMake the OE wait to be unconditional, to handle the reverted isize\nsituation.\n\nAnd since lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() now either lock the\nextents or return -EAGAIN, also remove the branches that handles\nno-extent-locked cases, and rename it to remove the \"_if_need\" suffix.\n\nThe following micro benchmark shows the runtime difference for\nbtrfs_buffered_write(), doing `xfs_io -f -c \"pwrite 0 1m\"` workload,\nall values are the average runtime in nano seconds.\n\n      function runtime              |   before    |     after\n -----------------------------------+-------------+---------------\n lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need()  |     58.2    |    183.0\n btrfs_buffered_write()             |   2115.6    |   2973.3\n\nThe overall runtime of btrfs_buffered_write() is still pretty\ntiny (still less than 3 micro seconds), I'd say the extra cost is still\nacceptable.\n\nAn alternative to fix this problem is to wait ordered extents during\niomap_end() where the isize revert is done.\n\nBut that solution will break nowait requirement, as if a nowait direct\nIO finished short, we have to wait for the OEs unconditionally or the\nnext append buffered IO can still hit the same problem.\n\nSo here we have to move the wait cost to buffered write, but at least\nthe code is slightly more streamline.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"btrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races","id":"CVE-2026-90264","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"race_condition","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":5,"next":{"headline":"btrfs: defrag: fix deadlock between defrag and delalloc space reservation","id":"CVE-2026-90265"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"btrfs: check if root is readonly when setting posix acl","id":"CVE-2026-90263"},"products":["Linux"],"published":"2026-09-17","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-10-21","vendors":["Linux"]},"summary":"A race condition in the Linux kernel's Btrfs filesystem allows local attackers to trigger a kernel panic via concurrent direct and buffered writes.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-90264/"}