{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-96455 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-96455 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-96455 is a high-severity missing authorization vulnerability in Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini, published on 23 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-96455 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-96455 is a high-severity missing authorization vulnerability in Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini, published on 23 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-96455 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-96455/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-96455/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-96455","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-96455/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-96455","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-8w3q-4cmj-h32j"],"analysis":{"component_type":"iot_embedded","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["code_execution"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Reachy Mini robot","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Unauthenticated attackers on the network can install malicious Python packages via the app installation endpoint, leading to remote code execution on the robot.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"missing_authorization"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"JFROG","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":8.8,"severity":"high","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-494","name":"Download of Code Without Integrity Check"},{"id":"CWE-306","name":"Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality"}],"description":"The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.\n\nThe endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.\n\nHow far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.\n\nOne related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint","id":"CVE-2026-96455","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"missing_authorization","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":5,"next":{"headline":"Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device","id":"CVE-2026-96456"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"Pake grants unrestricted IPC access to every HTTPS origin loaded in generated applications","id":"CVE-2026-96454"},"products":["Reachy Mini"],"published":"2026-09-23","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"total"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-09-23","vendors":["Pollen Robotics"]},"summary":"Unauthenticated attackers on the network can install malicious Python packages via the app installation endpoint, leading to remote code execution on the robot.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-96455/"}