{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-96456 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for CVE-2026-96456 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"CVE-2026-96456 is a medium-severity vulnerability in Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini, published on 23 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-96456 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-96456 is a medium-severity vulnerability in Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini, published on 23 Sep 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-96456 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-96456/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-96456/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-96456","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-96456/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-96456","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf","GHSA-w8hv-46m4-pm2j"],"analysis":{"component_type":"iot_embedded","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["privilege_escalation","code_execution"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Reachy Mini robot","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can bypass Bluetooth PIN authentication by racing a legitimate user, gaining command access to the robot.","user_interaction":"required","vuln_class":"race_condition"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"JFROG","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":6.3,"severity":"medium","source":"cna","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","version":"3.1"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-362","name":"Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization"},{"id":"CWE-287","name":"Improper Authentication"}],"description":"The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.\n\nThe authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.\n\nOnce any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.\n\nThis is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device","id":"CVE-2026-96456","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"race_condition","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":5,"next":{"headline":"WordPress Amelia plugin \u003c= 2.4.10 - Broken Access Control vulnerability","id":"CVE-2026-96461"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint","id":"CVE-2026-96455"},"products":["Reachy Mini"],"published":"2026-09-23","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CWE Terms of Use","name":"CWE (MITRE)"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"FIRST CVSS licence","name":"CVSS (FIRST)"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":"no","exploitation":"none","technical_impact":"partial"},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-09-23","vendors":["Pollen Robotics"]},"summary":"Attackers can bypass Bluetooth PIN authentication by racing a legitimate user, gaining command access to the robot.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-96456/"}