{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-98068 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Apply the vendor's patch.","what":"CVE-2026-98068 is a vulnerability in Linux, published on 25 Sep 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for CVE-2026-98068 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: CVE-2026-98068 is a vulnerability in Linux, published on 25 Sep 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-98068 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected product: Linux. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-98068/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-98068/index.md)","id":"CVE-2026-98068","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-98068/index.md","name":"CVE-2026-98068","record":{"aliases":["AZL-110485","BELL-CVE-2026-98068","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98068","GHSA-v6pw-c666-7jqh","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98068"],"analysis":{"component_type":"kernel","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["denial_of_service","other"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Linux kernel RDS","requires_auth":"none","summary":"A race condition in the Linux kernel RDS module allows attackers to cause a denial of service by leaving sockets established and wedging the connection path.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"race_condition"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":"Linux","cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: don't let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop\n\nrds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from\nRDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts\nRDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that\na FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail\nthe shutdown into a noisy error path.\n\nBut consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that\ncame with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues\ncp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN\nis a no-op.  For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN\narrived on is the very socket the teardown just released.  It is not\nharmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first.\n\nrds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper.  Its path claim in\nrds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -\u003e\nRDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous\nsocket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path\ninto RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that\nfollows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR.  The accept then installs the\nfreshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued\nteardown - which sampled tc-\u003et_sock before this socket existed - is\nstill running.  rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to\nRDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should\nreap the socket it just installed.  If the in-flight shutdown's final\ntransition consumes that drop's RDS_CONN_ERROR, the queued pass finds\nthe path in RDS_CONN_DOWN and does nothing.  The installed socket is\nnever torn down: it sits established with its callbacks armed and its\nrds_tcp_connection on rds_tcp_tc_list, the peer sees a connection that\nnothing ever reads, and the path is wedged in RDS_CONN_DOWN until some\nlater event drops it again.  Reproduced with widened race windows as\nan ever-growing receive queue on a socket owned by a path stuck in\nRDS_CONN_DOWN, with the peer's send path wedged behind it.\n\nMake the final transition only DISCONNECTING -\u003e DOWN.  If it fails\nbecause the path is in RDS_CONN_ERROR, a drop raced the teardown:\ncancel the reconnect timer and clear RDS_RECONNECT_PENDING - the one\npiece of the skipped tail that must not be left behind - and return,\nletting the pass the drop queued finish the job: it tears down\nwhatever attached to the path in the meantime, completes the\ntransition to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and re-arms the reconnect from its own\ntail.\n\nThe timer quiesce in that branch matters because the racing drop does\nnot always queue that pass: rds_conn_path_drop() returns without\nqueueing when a destroy is pending - exactly the situation during a\nnetns teardown or module unload, when a FIN on the dying socket is\nprocessed while rds_conn_path_destroy() flushes cp_down_w.  If the\nflushed pass is the one that takes this return, no later pass exists,\nand rds_conn_path_destroy() would find cp_conn_w still armed\n(WARN_ON) and then free a path whose reconnect timer can still fire.\nWith the cancel in the branch, every exit of a shutdown pass leaves\nthe timer quiesced no matter which pass completes the transition.\n\nThe FIN case keeps making progress, one pass later and still without\nnoisy logging.  Any other state keeps today's rds_conn_path_error()\nhandling; no current cp_state writer can leave a DISCONNECTING path\nin anything but RDS_CONN_ERROR (every other writer is a cmpxchg from\na non-DISCONNECTING state), so that branch is defensive.\n\nOn kernels without the preceding patches the same hazard exists with\nthe sample-based quiesce; the fix applies there equally.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":0,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":0,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":0,"nuclei":0,"refs":[],"tier":"none_known"},"has_fix":true,"headline":"net/rds: don't let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop","id":"CVE-2026-98068","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"cve","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"race_condition","year":"2026"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":8,"next":{"headline":"net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()","id":"CVE-2026-98069"},"packages":[],"prev":{"headline":"erofs: disable LZ4 rolling decompression for now","id":"CVE-2026-98067"},"products":["Linux"],"published":"2026-09-25","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CVE Terms of Use (MITRE)","name":"CVE List","prefix":"CVE"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":"PUBLISHED","updated":"2026-10-19","vendors":["Linux"]},"summary":"A race condition in the Linux kernel RDS module allows attackers to cause a denial of service by leaving sockets established and wedging the connection path.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-98068/"}