CVE-2026-98395 powerpc/entry: Fix irq_soft_mask corruption on replayed interrupt exit

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A flaw in the Linux kernel's PowerPC interrupt handling can cause a kernel warning and potential system instability during interrupt replay, leading to denial of service.

Exploited in the wild
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Attackable
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Victim action needed
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Fix
Available

What is CVE-2026-98395?

CVE-2026-98395 is a denial of service vulnerability in Linux, published on 14 Oct 2026.

Official description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/entry: Fix irq_soft_mask corruption on replayed interrupt exit

When __replay_soft_interrupts() replays a pending interrupt (e.g. PACA_IRQ_DEC -> timer_interrupt), it calls the handler directly with a synthetic pt_regs. The DEFINE_INTERRUPT_HANDLER_ASYNC wrapper around each handler calls arch_interrupt_async_exit_prepare() on the way out, which calls arch_interrupt_exit_prepare() -> local_irq_disable() -> arch_local_irq_disable(), which does:

irq_soft_mask_set(IRQS_DISABLED) /* 0x1 */

This unconditionally overwrites irq_soft_mask with IRQS_DISABLED (0x1), stripping the IRQS_PMI_DISABLED (0x2) bit. The result is that irq_soft_mask is 0x1 instead of IRQS_ALL_DISABLED (0x3) when the handler returns to __replay_soft_interrupts().

For a normally-taken interrupt this is harmless: the next interrupt always enters through arch_interrupt_enter_prepare() which unconditionally sets irq_soft_mask to IRQS_ALL_DISABLED. But during replay, next_interrupt() is called directly between replayed handlers without going back through arch_interrupt_enter_prepare(), so the stripped bit is never restored. next_interrupt() then fires a WARNING:

WARNING: arch/powerpc/kernel/irq_64.c:75 WARN_ON(irq_soft_mask_return() != IRQS_ALL_DISABLED)

The warning was observed early in boot on a POWER10 pseries guest during kmem_cache_init_late(), where a spinlock release triggers interrupt replay that processes a pending timer interrupt.

Debugger state confirming the bug: Before timer_interrupt(&regs): irq_soft_mask = 0x3 (IRQS_ALL_DISABLED) correct irq_happened = 0x41 (HARD_DIS|REPLAYING) correct After timer_interrupt(&regs) returns: irq_soft_mask = 0x1 (IRQS_DISABLED) WRONG - PMI bit stripped irq_happened = 0x41 unchanged

The fix is to replace local_irq_disable() with hard_irq_disable().

hard_irq_disable() is the right primitive here for two reasons:

1. On PPC64 (hw_irq.h:301) it calls irq_soft_mask_set_return(IRQS_ALL_DISABLED), setting the soft mask to 0x3 (both IRQS_DISABLED and IRQS_PMI_DISABLED), which preserves the PMI bit and fixes the WARNING. The additional work it does (__hard_irq_disable(), PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS |=) is redundant but safe since both are already set at this point in the exit path; the trace_hardirqs_off() inside is guarded by if (!arch_irqs_disabled_flags(flags)) so it will not double-fire.

2. On PPC32 (hw_irq.h:467) hard_irq_disable() maps to arch_local_irq_disable() -> __hard_irq_disable(), which clears MSR[EE] in hardware. This is exactly correct: PPC32 has no soft-mask PACA mechanism, so the hardware disable is the right way to satisfy irqentry_exit()'s requirement. This also fixes a build error on PPC32 where irq_soft_mask_set() is only defined under CONFIG_PPC64:

arch/powerpc/include/asm/entry-common.h:273: error: implicit declaration of function 'irq_soft_mask_set'

Using hard_irq_disable() requires no #ifdef and is consistent with how the rest of the entry code (e.g. entry-common.h:463) handles the same PPC32/PPC64 split.

Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-98395?

How do I fix CVE-2026-98395?

Apply the vendor's patch.

Upgrade, then put limits on request size, rate and nesting depth so one client cannot exhaust the service. More about Denial of service.

Is CVE-2026-98395 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of CVE-2026-98395 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Sources

Also known as DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98395, GHSA-c6r3-334m-j754, UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98395.

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