{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including openclaw.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade openclaw to 2026.3.2 or later.","what":"GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in openclaw, published on 3 Mar 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in openclaw, published on 3 Mar 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- openclaw (npm): affected from 2026.2.13; fixed in 2026.3.2\n- openclaw (npm): affected from 2026.2.13; fixed in 2026.3.2\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp/index.md)","id":"GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp/index.md","name":"GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Node.js camera library","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"A malicious paired node can force the gateway to fetch arbitrary internal URLs via camera payloads, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery and internal network probing.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"ssrf"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\nOpenClaw accepted `camera.snap` / `camera.clip` node payload `url` fields and downloaded them on the gateway/agent host without binding downloads to the resolved node host.\n\nIn OpenClaw's documented trust model, paired nodes are in the same operator trust boundary, so this is scoped as medium-severity hardening. A malicious or compromised paired node could still steer gateway-host fetches during camera URL retrieval.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.13 \u003c= 2026.3.1`\n- Latest vulnerable published version at time of update: `2026.3.1`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.3.2` (released)\n\n### Technical Details\nVulnerable flows accepted URL payloads and downloaded directly from the provided URL:\n- `src/cli/nodes-camera.ts` (`writeUrlToFile`) fetched URL payloads without node-host binding.\n- `src/cli/nodes-cli/register.camera.ts` passed `camera.snap` / `camera.clip` payload URLs into that downloader.\n- `src/agents/tools/nodes-tool.ts` did the same for `camera_snap` / `camera_clip` tool actions.\n\n### Impact\nA malicious/compromised paired node could cause gateway-host URL fetches to off-node destinations reachable from the host network. This could be used for internal network probing/fetch pivots in deployments where paired nodes are not fully trusted.\n\n### Remediation\nThe fix introduces fail-closed node-host binding and guarded fetch for camera URL payload downloads:\n- Require resolved node host metadata for URL payload downloads.\n- Enforce hostname match between payload URL and resolved node host.\n- Use SSRF-guarded fetch with redirect host/protocol checks.\n- Apply the same enforcement across CLI and agent tool camera paths.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `3bf19d6f40a0aaa55818b96eede3d05130c02533`","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"OpenClaw: Node camera URL payload host-binding bypass allowed gateway fetch pivots","id":"GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"ssrf","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.3.2"],"introduced":["2026.2.13"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.3.2"],"introduced":["2026.2.13"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":"pkg:npm/openclaw","source":"GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-03-03","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"A malicious paired node can force the gateway to fetch arbitrary internal URLs via camera payloads, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery and internal network probing.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp/"}