GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r Impact <!-- _What kind of vulnerability is it?

Not scored Published

Attacker can cause denial of service in Rust HD wallet libraries by forcing infinite loops when using non-standard elliptic curves.

Exploited in the wild
Not known
Login needed
Not needed
Attackable
Over the internet
Victim action needed
Not needed
Fix
Available

What is GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r?

GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r is a denial of service vulnerability in hd-wallet, published on 18 Dec 2024. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.

Official description

Impact

<!– What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? –>

Impacted are the only ones who use hd_wallet::Slip10Like or slip_10 derivation method instantiated with curves other than secp256k1 and secp256r1.

hd_wallet crate used to provide Slip10Like derivation method, which is also provided in slip-10 crate as a default derivation method. It's based on slip10 method that searches for a valid child key in an infinite loop until it's found.

Theoretically, this could be exploited by an attacker by finding a derivation path that would force someone to execute a lot of iterations of this loop to find a valid child key. This attack, however, requires the probability of getting an invalid scalar from random 32 bytes to be high. Slip10 is protected from this attack as it's only defined on secp256k1 and secp256r1 curves, for which such probability is very low:

  • For secp256k1, probability is $< 2^{-127}$. This means that a loop with 2 or more iterations is vanishingly impossible.
  • For secp256r1, probability is $< 2^{-32}$. This means that a loop with 5 or more iterations is vanishingly impossible.

While standard curves are safe to use with slip10, we used to allow slip10-like derivation which can be instantiated with any curve. For instance, one could instantiate it with ed25519 or stark curves, for which probability of getting invalid scalar from random 32 bytes is >90%, so theoretically, attacker could try to DoS such construction.

Patches

<!– Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? –>

hd_wallet v0.6.0 has been patched by removing slip10-like derivation from public API.

If you need HD derivation on other curves than secp256k1 and secp256r1, we suggest you to use:

Both derivation methods are non-standard, but secure and efficient.

If you're still using slip_10 and would like to migrate to patched version, please migrate to hd_wallet v0.6. You may first migrate from slip_10 v0.4 to hd_wallet v0.5 by following migration instructions available in the docs, and then upgrade from hd_wallet v0.5 to hd_wallet v0.6.

Workarounds

Technically, you don't need to upgrade if you don't use slip10-like derivation instantiated with other curves than secp256k1 or secp256r1.

However, if you do, migrating to other derivation method might be required.

Reach out to us in Discord

If you want to reach out to us, feel free to write to #lockness room in Discord

Credits

Thanks to Alessio Marziali <[email protected]> for discovering and flagging this issue

Which versions are affected by GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r?

4 open source packages ship an affected version, including hd-wallet and slip-10.

PackageAffectedFixed in
hd-wallet crates.ioAll versions0.6.0
hd-wallet crates.ioAll versions0.6.0
slip-10 crates.ioAll versions to 0.4.1None
slip-10 crates.ioAll versions to 0.4.1None

How do I fix GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r?

Upgrade hd-wallet to 0.6.0 or later.

Upgrade, then put limits on request size, rate and nesting depth so one client cannot exhaust the service. More about Denial of service.

Is GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r in the wild and no public exploit code.

Sources

Is GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r in your software?

Upload an SBOM and sbomify checks it against every vulnerability here, every day.

Check your SBOMs for free