GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
A remote attacker can cause a denial of service by sending crafted DNS responses that trigger an infinite loop in DNSSEC validation, exhausting memory.
- Exploited in the wild
- Not known
- Login needed
- Not needed
- Attackable
- Over the internet
- Victim action needed
- Not needed
- Fix
- Available
What is GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465?
GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 is a denial of service vulnerability in hickory-net, published on 1 May 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
Official description
The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in hickory-proto's (0.25.0-alpha.3 … 0.25.2) and hickory-net's (0.26.0-alpha.1 .. 0.26.0) DnssecDnsHandle walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never terminates, repeatedly calling Name::base_name() and pushing newly allocated Name and hashed-name entries into the candidate Vec.
The bug is reachable by any caller of DnssecDnsHandle, including the resolver, recursor, and client, when built with the dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3 validation.
A debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root()) guards the loop body, so debug builds abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the process exhausts available memory. A reachable upstream attacker who can return such a response can therefore crash a debug build or exhaust memory on a release build, for the affected configurations.
The affected code was migrated from hickory-proto to hickory-net as part of the 0.26.0 release. Hickory DNS recommends that all affected users update to hickory-net 0.26.1 for the fix.
Reporter
David Cook, ISRG
Which versions are affected by GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465?
6 open source packages ship an affected version, including hickory-net and hickory-proto.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
hickory-net crates.io | From 0.0.0-0 | 0.26.1 |
hickory-net crates.io | From 0.26.0-alpha.1 | 0.26.1 |
hickory-net crates.io | From 0.26.0-alpha.1 | 0.26.1 |
hickory-proto crates.io | From 0.25.0-alpha.3 to 0.25.2 | None |
hickory-proto crates.io | From 0.25.0-alpha.3 to 0.25.2 | None |
hickory-proto crates.io | From 0.25.0-alpha.3 | 0.26.0-beta.1 |
How do I fix GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465?
Upgrade hickory-net to 0.26.1 or later.
Upgrade, then put limits on request size, rate and nesting depth so one client cannot exhaust the service. More about Denial of service.
Is GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 in the wild and no public exploit code.
Sources
Also known as RUSTSEC-2026-0118, RUSTSEC-2026-0120.