GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses

Not scored Published

A remote attacker can cause a denial of service by sending crafted DNS responses that trigger an infinite loop in DNSSEC validation, exhausting memory.

Exploited in the wild
Not known
Login needed
Not needed
Attackable
Over the internet
Victim action needed
Not needed
Fix
Available

What is GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465?

GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 is a denial of service vulnerability in hickory-net, published on 1 May 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.

Official description

The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in hickory-proto's (0.25.0-alpha.3 … 0.25.2) and hickory-net's (0.26.0-alpha.1 .. 0.26.0) DnssecDnsHandle walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never terminates, repeatedly calling Name::base_name() and pushing newly allocated Name and hashed-name entries into the candidate Vec.

The bug is reachable by any caller of DnssecDnsHandle, including the resolver, recursor, and client, when built with the dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3 validation.

A debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root()) guards the loop body, so debug builds abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the process exhausts available memory. A reachable upstream attacker who can return such a response can therefore crash a debug build or exhaust memory on a release build, for the affected configurations.

The affected code was migrated from hickory-proto to hickory-net as part of the 0.26.0 release. Hickory DNS recommends that all affected users update to hickory-net 0.26.1 for the fix.

Reporter

David Cook, ISRG

Which versions are affected by GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465?

6 open source packages ship an affected version, including hickory-net and hickory-proto.

PackageAffectedFixed in
hickory-net crates.ioFrom 0.0.0-00.26.1
hickory-net crates.ioFrom 0.26.0-alpha.10.26.1
hickory-net crates.ioFrom 0.26.0-alpha.10.26.1
hickory-proto crates.ioFrom 0.25.0-alpha.3 to 0.25.2None
hickory-proto crates.ioFrom 0.25.0-alpha.3 to 0.25.2None
hickory-proto crates.ioFrom 0.25.0-alpha.30.26.0-beta.1

How do I fix GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465?

Upgrade hickory-net to 0.26.1 or later.

Upgrade, then put limits on request size, rate and nesting depth so one client cannot exhaust the service. More about Denial of service.

Is GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Sources

Also known as RUSTSEC-2026-0118, RUSTSEC-2026-0120.

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