# GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp: UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS and UNEDITABLE_TABLE_DESCRIPTION_MATCH_RULES not respected by frontend service backend

> Attackers can modify table and column descriptions in Amundsen despite backend configuration restrictions, bypassing intended data integrity controls.

- **Severity:** Not scored
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Any signed-in user
- **Attackable:** Over the internet
- **Victim action needed:** Not needed
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 2 Dec 2020

## What is GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp?

GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp is a missing authorization vulnerability in amundsen-frontend, published on 2 Dec 2020. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.

### Official description

### Impact
Any install that has `UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS` and/or `UNEDITABLE_TABLE_DESCRIPTION_MATCH_RULES` set in the front-end, is being impacted. The value of these properties is ignored if set, allowing any user to modify table and column descriptions, even though the properties imply they shouldn't be.

### Patches
There is an attached PR that applies this restriction on the back-end.

### Workarounds
N/A

### References
N/A

### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Email us at [amundsen-security@lists.lfaidata.foundation](mailto:amundsen-security@lists.lfaidata.foundation)

### More details
Summary: I believe that UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS and
UNEDITABLE_TABLE_DESCRIPTION_MATCH_RULES are only being applied on the
front-end, not on the frontend service back-end, allowing any user to
modify table and column descriptions even if this configuration parameter
is set.

Repro steps:

1. docker-compose -f docker-amundsen.yml up neo4j elasticsearch
amundsensearch amundsenmetadata
2. python example/scripts/sample_data_loader.py
3. FRONTEND_SVC_CONFIG_MODULE_CLASS=amundsen_application.config.TestConfig
PYTHONPATH=. python3 amundsen_application/wsgi.py
4. Attempt a modification to a table description:

curl '<http://localhost:5000/api/metadata/v0/put_table_description>' \\\\
-X 'PUT' \\\\
-H 'Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8' \\\\
--data-binary '{"description":"2t test table","key":"hive://gold.test_schema/test_table1","source":"user"}'
{"msg":"Success"}

5. This correctly succeeds, which can be validated by GETing the info:

curl '<http://localhost:5000/api/metadata/v0/get_table_description?key=hive://gold.test_schema/test_table1>'
{"description":"1st test table","msg":"Success"}

At this point, modify TestConfig inside config.py to add this line: UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS
= set(['test_schema'])

You can now re-run step 4, and step 5 with different data, and confirm
that the modification has persisted. If you build and run the UI, you can
see that on the page
<http://localhost:5000/table_detail/gold/hive/test_schema/test_table1>
http://localhost:5000/table_detail/gold/hive/test_schema/test_table1, the
inline editor is correctly disabled.

Looking at
amundsenfrontendlibrary/amundsen_application/api/metadata/v0.py:268
put_table_description, you can see there's no reference to
UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS or UNEDITABLE_TABLE_DESCRIPTION_MATCH_RULES.

The only place I can find these referenced is in
amundsenfrontendlibrary/amundsen_application/api/utils/metadata_utils.py:marshall_table_full,
which would explain why the UI is correctly respecting this setting.

If this is correct, put_column_description would also be similarly
affected.

I believe the correct fix for all of these methods is to load the table,
run it through marshall_dashboard_partial to fully evaluate what's
editable or not (to reuse the same code path for FE and back-end), and
reject the response if it's not editable. I'll implement a fix along these
lines once someone confirms this.

History: This functionality was introduced in
<https://github.com/amundsen-io/amundsenfrontendlibrary/pull/497/files>
https://github.com/amundsen-io/amundsenfrontendlibrary/pull/497 on July
9, corresponding to the 2.3.0 release of amundsenfrontend. That release was
introduced into the main repo dockerfile on October 28 in
<https://github.com/amundsen-io/amundsen/pull/785>
https://github.com/amundsen-io/amundsen/pull/785

## Which versions are affected by GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp?

4 open source packages ship an affected version, including amundsen-frontend.


| Package | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `amundsen-frontend` | PyPI | From 2.3.0 | 3.1.0 |
| `amundsen-frontend` | PyPI | From 2.3.0 | 3.1.0 |
| `amundsen-frontend` | PyPI | From 3.0.0 | 3.1.0 |
| `amundsen-frontend` | PyPI | From 3.0.0 | 3.1.0 |

## How do I fix GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp?

Upgrade amundsen-frontend to 3.1.0 or later.

## Is GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp in the wild and no public exploit code.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
Check this codebase for GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp and fix it if it is affected.

What it is: GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp is a missing authorization vulnerability in amundsen-frontend, published on 2 Dec 2020. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp in the wild and no public exploit code.

Affected packages and fixed versions:
- amundsen-frontend (PyPI): affected from 2.3.0; fixed in 3.1.0
- amundsen-frontend (PyPI): affected from 2.3.0; fixed in 3.1.0
- amundsen-frontend (PyPI): affected from 3.0.0; fixed in 3.1.0
- amundsen-frontend (PyPI): affected from 3.0.0; fixed in 3.1.0

Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.