{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including zeptoclaw.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade zeptoclaw to 0.7.6 or later.","what":"GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f is an authentication bypass vulnerability in zeptoclaw, published on 12 Mar 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f is an authentication bypass vulnerability in zeptoclaw, published on 12 Mar 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- zeptoclaw (crates.io): affected all versions; fixed in 0.7.6\n- zeptoclaw (crates.io): affected all versions; fixed in 0.7.6\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f/index.md)","id":"GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f/index.md","name":"GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"server_software","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":true,"product_category":"Email channel bot","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can spoof email headers to bypass sender allowlists in ZeptoClaw if upstream email authentication is weak, allowing unauthorized message processing.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"auth_bypass"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\nThe email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed `From` header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input. \n\n### Details\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:311` extracts sender identity from parsed message headers:\n  - `let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...`\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:328` authorizes using that `from` value:\n  - `if !self.is_sender_allowed(\u0026from) { ... }`\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:87` onward (`is_sender_allowed`) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value.\n- There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions.\n\nResult:\n- Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced.\n\n### PoC\n1. Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist:\n   - `channels.email.enabled = true`\n   - `channels.email.allowed_senders = [\"ceo@example.com\"]`\n   - `channels.email.deny_by_default = true`\n2. Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly).\n3. Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity:\n\n```bash\npython - \u003c\u003c'PY'\nimport smtplib\nfrom email.message import EmailMessage\n\nmsg = EmailMessage()\nmsg[\"From\"] = \"ceo@example.com\"   # forged trusted sender\nmsg[\"To\"] = \"bot-inbox@example.net\"\nmsg[\"Subject\"] = \"forged control message\"\nmsg.set_content(\"FORGED EMAIL CONTENT\")\n\n# Example test SMTP endpoint\nwith smtplib.SMTP(\"127.0.0.1\", 25) as s:\n    s.send_message(msg)\nPY\n```\n\n4. Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing.\n5. Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender `ceo@example.com` and published as inbound channel input.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization.\n- Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed.\n- Security effect:\n  - Spoofed `From` headers may bypass logical sender allowlist.\n  - Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities.\n- Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer.\n\n### Patch Recommendation\nAdd a sender-authentication gate in `src/channels/email_channel.rs` immediately after parsing `from` (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:311`) and before allowlist enforcement (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:328`). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, `DMARC=pass`, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before `is_sender_allowed` is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in `EmailConfig` (for example, `sender_verification_mode`), but recommend hardened settings in production: `dmarc_aligned`, exact-address allowlists, and `deny_by_default=true`.","ecosystems":["crates.io"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation","id":"GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"crates.io","product":null,"products":[],"type":"auth_bypass","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["0.7.6"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"zeptoclaw","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f"},{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["0.7.6"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"zeptoclaw","purl":"pkg:cargo/zeptoclaw","source":"GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-03-12","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can spoof email headers to bypass sender allowlists in ZeptoClaw if upstream email authentication is weak, allowing unauthorized message processing.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f/"}