GHSA-4gph-2hhr-5mwg Envoy AI Proxy - MCP Message Smuggling Vulnerability

Envoy AI Gateway was found to be affected by a protocol parser differential vulnerability due to improper implementation of the JSON-RPC 2.0 specification. Such differential causes a MCP message alteration, potentially causing a bypass of security controls in a multi-layered architecture.

According to the JSON RPC Spec used by Model Context Protocol, JSON RPC should be case sensitive https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification

[...]
All member names exchanged between the Client and the Server that are considered for matching of any kind should be considered to be case-sensitive. The terms function, method, and procedure can be assumed to be interchangeable.

The AI Gateway is accepting and processing case-variant fields that compliant MCP implementations correctly ignore. Crucially, Envoy does not just "pass through" the message by acting as a transparent proxy, it alters the traffic, allowing smuggling of unwanted requests.

The following steps represent the incoming message alteration:

1. Incoming MCP Message:

{
    id: 1,
    jsonrpc: "2.0",
    method: "tools/call",
    params: {
        name: "backend__greet",
        Name: "backend__secretTool",
        arguments: {
            name: "World!"
        },
        Arguments: {
            name: "Exploit"
        }
    }
}

2. Parses the request, picking the non-standard Name field over the authorized name field due to internal case-insentitive parsing by libraries such as modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/jsonrpc and github.com/bytedance/sonic
3. Overwrites the authorized "backend__greet" value from the valid name field with the malicious value from the Name field
4. Normalizes the injected "backend__secretTool" value (from the invalid Name field)
5. Re-serializes the request into a new, valid MCP JRPC payload ({"name": "backend__secretTool"}) and forwards it upstream

This "smuggling" effect means Envoy actively transforms a request that might have been checked by any prior MCP-compliant implementation into a request that is valid and altered (from the perspective of the upstream backend), effectively introducing protocol modifications that may allow bypassing any prior authorization layer.

Root Cause Analysis

The root cause is a parser differential combined with serialization quirk typical of Go-based JSON parsers:

1. Case-Insensitive Unmarshaling - When parsing a JSON key into a struct field, Go's json.Unmarshal looks for an a case-insensitive match. Go matches "Name" to the struct tag json:"name". If "name": "safe" is also present, the last key processed wins, allowing an attacker to inject a different tool name when the MCP message reaches the Go-SDK parsing
2. Strict Struct-Tag Marshaling - When converting a struct back to JSON, Go always uses the exact key specified in the Struct json:"..." tag. Consequently, an overwritten value from a cased field could be stored in a proper lowercased parameter, later processed by a spec-compliant MCP message receiver

The vulnerability involves the usage of the jsonrpc module of github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk, which is not following the MCP mandated JSON RPC spec for messages parsing, using case insensitive matching.

The non-compliant parsing primitive is jsonrpc.DecodeMessage, it is widely used to parse the incoming MCP messages. See at:

• ai-gateway/internal/mcpproxy/handlers.go:242,739
• ai-gateway/internal/mcpproxy/mcpproxy.go:303
• ai-gateway/internal/mcpproxy/session.go:409
• ai-gateway/internal/mcpproxy/sse.go:88

Consequently, internals relying on objects parsed with the cited primitive are using case-insentive parsing, also subject to Unicode to ASCII Folding.

Furthermore, the internal logic is also relying on the internal/json package, acting as a wrapper around github.com/bytedance/sonic (Sonic), a high-performance JSON library that defaults to loose, case-insensitive unmarshalling.

File: internal/json/json.go

import (
	sonicjson "github.com/bytedance/sonic"
)
var (
	Unmarshal = sonicjson.ConfigDefault.Unmarshal
    Marshal   = sonicjson.ConfigDefault.Marshal
)

In combination with the above mentioned spec departure, the message MCP message reconstruction logic is causing an alteration of the protocol calls passing through the gateway.

Example Vulnerable Data Flow - tools/call

The alteration occurs in ai-gateway/internal/mcpproxy/handlers.go:180 during the processing of a function servePOST.

As an example, we can focus on the processing of incoming MCP tools/call requests.

When the gateway receives a JSON-RPC request, it executes servePOST function, which then calls jsonrpc.DecodeMessage to parse the body of the bytes read from the request.

See at ai-gateway/internal/mcpproxy/handlers.go:235-242

...
	body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
	if err != nil {
		errType = metrics.MCPErrorInternal
		onErrorResponse(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
		return
	}

	rawMsg, err := jsonrpc.DecodeMessage(body)
    ...

If the request method is tools/call, the following code is executed at ai-gateway/internal/mcpproxy/handlers.go:366

		case "tools/call":
			params = &mcp.CallToolParams{}
			span, err = parseParamsAndMaybeStartSpan(ctx, m, msg, params, r.Header)
			if err != nil {
				errType = metrics.MCPErrorInvalidParam
				m.l.Error("Failed to unmarshal params", slog.String("method", msg.Method), slog.String("error", err.Error()))
				onErrorResponse(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid params")
				return
			}
			err = m.handleToolCallRequest(ctx, s, w, msg, params.(*mcp.CallToolParams), span, r)

At this point, the params object is a mcp.CallToolParams struct incorrectly parsed by Anthropic's jsonrpc.DecodeMessage as case insentitive object. The params object is then passed to handleToolCallRequest function, which will execute the tool call.

See at definition of handleToolCallRequest at ai-gateway/internal/mcpproxy/handlers.go:638

func (m *mcpRequestContext) handleToolCallRequest(ctx context.Context, s *session, w http.ResponseWriter, req *jsonrpc.Request, p *mcp.CallToolParams, span tracingapi.MCPSpan, r *http.Request) error {

	// ... REDACTED CODE TO Enforce authentication and authorizationif required by the route ...

	// Send the request to the MCP backend listener.
	p.Name = toolName
	param, _ := json.Marshal(p)
	if m.l.Enabled(ctx, slog.LevelDebug) {
		logger := m.l.With(slog.String("tool", p.Name), slog.Any("session", cse))
		logger.Debug("Routing to backend")
	}
	if span != nil {
		span.RecordRouteToBackend(backend.Name, string(cse.sessionID), false)
	}
	req.Params = param
	return m.invokeAndProxyResponse(ctx, s, w, backend, cse, req)
}

In the code pattern above, the final alteration of the MCP message happens. The function is using as json parser the wrapper around sonic (ai-gateway/internal/json), which is a case-insensitive parser, to reserialize the parameter struct with json.Marshal.

When the struct is re-marshaled, it uses the exact casing defined in the struct's JSON tag. This allows an attacker to "smuggle" a malicious value through a non-standard key name, bypassing case-sensitive filters on previous stages of the request handling by other MCP-compliant components.

In conclusion, the described MCP message alteration is ensuring that the final proxied version by Envoy-AI Gateway will become "canonical" and delivered upstream with smuggled malicious values.

Other Message Types

The Parser Differential is not limited to tools/call. It is a pervasive design issue caused by the Go SDK and Sonic manipulation of MCP Messages.

List of smuggling sinks:

• tools/call
• prompts/get
• resources/read

In conclusion, the reported smuggling problem is systemic in the AI Proxy.

Proof of Concept

Payload:

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "backend__greet",      // SAFE: Validated & A