{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including swiftmailer/swiftmailer.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade swiftmailer/swiftmailer to 5.2.1 or later.","what":"GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4 is a command injection vulnerability in swiftmailer/swiftmailer, published on 29 May 2024. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4 is a command injection vulnerability in swiftmailer/swiftmailer, published on 29 May 2024. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- swiftmailer/swiftmailer (Packagist): affected from 4.0.0; fixed in 5.2.1\n- swiftmailer/swiftmailer (Packagist): affected from 4.0.0; fixed in 5.2.1\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4/index.md)","id":"GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4/index.md","name":"GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["code_execution"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":true,"product_category":"PHP mail library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can execute arbitrary shell commands via the From header in Swiftmailer's sendmail transport when Return-Path is unconfigured.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"command_injection"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"Prior to 5.2.1, the sendmail transport (`Swift_Transport_SendmailTransport`) was vulnerable to an arbitrary shell execution if the \"From\" header came from a non-trusted source and no \"Return-Path\" is configured. This has been fixed in 5.2.1. If you are using sendmail as a transport, you are encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible.","ecosystems":["Packagist"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Swiftmailer Sendmail transport arbitrary shell execution","id":"GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"Packagist","product":null,"products":[],"type":"command_injection","year":"2024"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"Packagist","fixed":["5.2.1"],"introduced":["4.0.0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"swiftmailer/swiftmailer","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4"},{"ecosystem":"Packagist","fixed":["5.2.1"],"introduced":["4.0.0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"swiftmailer/swiftmailer","purl":"pkg:composer/swiftmailer/swiftmailer","source":"GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4"}],"products":null,"published":"2024-05-29","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can execute arbitrary shell commands via the From header in Swiftmailer's sendmail transport when Return-Path is unconfigured.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4qpj-gxxg-jqg4/"}