GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
Attackers can exploit SSRF in Novu's conditions filter webhook to read sensitive internal data, including cloud credentials, by bypassing URL validation.
- Exploited in the wild
- Not known
- Login needed
- Any signed-in user
- Attackable
- Over the internet
- Victim action needed
- Not needed
- Fix
- Available
What is GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f?
GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in @novu/api, published on 14 Apr 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.
Official description
Summary
The conditions filter webhook at libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw axios.post() with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses validateUrlSsrf() which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection.
Root Cause
conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261:
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config).then((response) => {
return response.data as Record<string, unknown>;
});
No call to validateUrlSsrf(). The webhookUrl comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation.
Protected Code (for contrast)
execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts line 130:
const ssrfValidationError = await validateUrlSsrf(url);
if (ssrfValidationError) {
// blocked
}
This function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path.
Proof of Concept
- Create a workflow with a condition step
- Configure the condition's webhook URL to
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ - Trigger the workflow by sending a notification event
- The worker evaluates the condition and calls
axios.post()to the metadata endpoint - The response data is stored in execution details and accessible via the execution details API
Impact
Full-read SSRF. The response body is returned as Record<string, unknown> for condition evaluation and stored in the execution details raw field. The GET /execution-details API returns this data.
The POST method limits some metadata endpoints (GCP requires GET, Azure requires GET), but AWS IMDSv1 accepts POST and returns credentials. Internal services accepting POST are also reachable.
Suggested Fix
Extract validateUrlSsrf() to a shared utility and call it before the axios.post in conditions-filter.usecase.ts:
const ssrfError = await validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl);
if (ssrfError) {
throw new Error('Webhook URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config)...
Which versions are affected by GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f?
2 open source packages ship an affected version, including @novu/api.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
@novu/api npm | All versions | 3.15.0 |
@novu/api npm | All versions | 3.15.0 |
How do I fix GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f?
Upgrade @novu/api to 3.15.0 or later.
Upgrade, and send outbound requests through an allow-list that blocks internal addresses. More about Server-side request forgery.
Is GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f in the wild and no public exploit code.