{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including @novu/api.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade @novu/api to 3.15.0 or later.","what":"GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in @novu/api, published on 14 Apr 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in @novu/api, published on 14 Apr 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- @novu/api (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 3.15.0\n- @novu/api (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 3.15.0\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f/index.md)","id":"GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f/index.md","name":"GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"web_application","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["data_read","privilege_escalation"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Novu notification platform","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Attackers can exploit SSRF in Novu's conditions filter webhook to read sensitive internal data, including cloud credentials, by bypassing URL validation.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"ssrf"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"## Summary\n\nThe conditions filter webhook at `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw `axios.post()` with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses `validateUrlSsrf()` which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`conditions-filter.usecase.ts` line 261:\n```typescript\nreturn await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config).then((response) =\u003e {\n  return response.data as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e;\n});\n```\n\nNo call to `validateUrlSsrf()`. The `webhookUrl` comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation.\n\n## Protected Code (for contrast)\n\n`execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` line 130:\n```typescript\nconst ssrfValidationError = await validateUrlSsrf(url);\nif (ssrfValidationError) {\n  // blocked\n}\n```\n\nThis function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. Create a workflow with a condition step\n2. Configure the condition's webhook URL to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`\n3. Trigger the workflow by sending a notification event\n4. The worker evaluates the condition and calls `axios.post()` to the metadata endpoint\n5. The response data is stored in execution details and accessible via the execution details API\n\n## Impact\n\nFull-read SSRF. The response body is returned as `Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e` for condition evaluation and stored in the execution details `raw` field. The `GET /execution-details` API returns this data.\n\nThe POST method limits some metadata endpoints (GCP requires GET, Azure requires GET), but AWS IMDSv1 accepts POST and returns credentials. Internal services accepting POST are also reachable.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nExtract `validateUrlSsrf()` to a shared utility and call it before the axios.post in conditions-filter.usecase.ts:\n\n```typescript\nconst ssrfError = await validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl);\nif (ssrfError) {\n  throw new Error('Webhook URL blocked by SSRF protection');\n}\nreturn await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config)...\n```","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection","id":"GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"ssrf","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["3.15.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"@novu/api","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["3.15.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"@novu/api","purl":"pkg:npm/%40novu/api","source":"GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-04-14","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can exploit SSRF in Novu's conditions filter webhook to read sensitive internal data, including cloud credentials, by bypassing URL validation.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f/"}