{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including phantom-audio.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade phantom-audio to 1.3.1 or later.","what":"GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227 is a path traversal vulnerability in phantom-audio, published on 9 Jul 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227 is a path traversal vulnerability in phantom-audio, published on 9 Jul 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- phantom-audio (PyPI): affected all versions; fixed in 1.3.1\n- phantom-audio (PyPI): affected all versions; fixed in 1.3.1\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227/index.md)","id":"GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227/index.md","name":"GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["code_execution","denial_of_service"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Python MCP tool","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can write arbitrary files or cause DoS via unconfined paths and missing decode limits in Phantom MCP tools, enabling local code execution.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"path_traversal"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Impact\n\nIn Phantom \u003c= 1.3.0, when `PHANTOM_OUTPUT_DIR` was unset (the default), the MCP tools accepted arbitrary absolute output paths with no confinement. Anything able to send tool calls (e.g. an AI agent driving the MCP interface) could **write or overwrite arbitrary files** the process user can write — including shell startup files (`~/.zshrc`) or a Reaper `__startup.lua`, which is effectively local code execution on a developer workstation.\n\nSeparately, the stem-separation and render paths decoded input audio with no size/duration cap (the analysis path was already guarded). A small, highly compressed FLAC/OGG could expand to multi-gigabyte PCM, causing memory-exhaustion DoS, and widened exposure to decoder bugs including libsndfile CVE-2026-37555.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.3.1**:\n- File writes are always confined to `PHANTOM_OUTPUT_DIR` (default `~/.phantom/output`); symlinks resolved and re-verified on the final path.\n- Decode/duration/size guards mirrored onto the separation and render paths (plus ffmpeg `-max_alloc`/`-t`/`-fs`).\n- Atomic `O_CREAT|O_EXCL` output creation in reference matching and symlink-TOCTOU hardening on confined input reads.\n\n### Workarounds\nSet `PHANTOM_OUTPUT_DIR` (and optionally `PHANTOM_AUDIO_DIR`) to dedicated directories before starting the server.\n\n### Credit\nFound during an internal security audit.","ecosystems":["PyPI"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Phantom: Arbitrary file write and decode-bomb DoS via unconfined MCP tool paths","id":"GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"PyPI","product":null,"products":[],"type":"path_traversal","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","fixed":["1.3.1"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"phantom-audio","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227"},{"ecosystem":"PyPI","fixed":["1.3.1"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"phantom-audio","purl":"pkg:pypi/phantom-audio","source":"GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-07-09","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can write arbitrary files or cause DoS via unconfined paths and missing decode limits in Phantom MCP tools, enabling local code execution.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-52vm-mxx8-f227/"}