{"answers":{"affected":"3 open source packages ship an affected version, including github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig to 0.7.0-alpha-2025-01-28 or later.","what":"GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253 is a vulnerability in github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig, published on 25 Nov 2024. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253 is a vulnerability in github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig, published on 25 Nov 2024. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig (Go): affected all versions; no fix listed\n- github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 0.7.0-alpha-2025-01-28\n- github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 0.7.0-alpha-2025-01-28\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253/index.md)","id":"GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253/index.md","name":"GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253","record":{"aliases":["GO-2024-3288"],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Go cryptographic library","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"A malicious participant can recover secret shares in the Taurus multi-party-sig library by reusing OT setups, compromising cryptographic security.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"weak_cryptography"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"Coinbase researchers reported 2 security issues in our implementation of the oblivious transfer (OT) based protocol [DKLS](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/499.pdf):\n\n### 1. Secret share recovery attack\n\nIf the base OT setup of the protocol is reused for another execution of the OT extension, then a malicious participant can extract a bit of the secret of another participant. By repeating the execution they can eventually recover the whole secret.\n\nTherefore, unlike our comments suggested, you **must not reuse an OT setup** for multiple protocol executions. \n\nWe're adding a warning in the code:\n\nhttps://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/blob/9e4400fccee89be6195d0a12dd0ed052288d5040/internal/ot/extended.go#L114\n\n### 2. Invalid security proof due to incorrect operator\n\nThe original 2018 version of the DKLS had a typo in the OT extension protocol when computing the check value in the OT extension: the paper noted a XOR whereas it should be a field multiplication. This erroneous behavior was implemented [in our code](https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/blob/4d84aafb57b437da1b933db9a265fb7ce4e7c138/internal/ot/extended.go#L188). \n\nThe proof of security fails in this case. No concrete attack is known, however.\n\nThe [2023 update](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/499.pdf) of the DKLS paper reported that typo and updated the protocol definition.\n\n~As of 20241124, patching is in progress (branch [otfix](https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/tree/otfix)), but not merged to the main branch yes as the tests fail to pass. We're troubleshooting the issue and will merge into the main branch when it's resolved.~\n\nAs of 20250128, a patched version is available in https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/releases/tag/v0.7.0-alpha-2025-01-28, thanks to https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/pull/119.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not reuse an OT setup in the event that an abort is detected, to eliminate the secret recovery attack.\n  \n\n### Credits\n\nThanks to the Coinbase researchers Yi-Hsiu Chen and Samuel Ranellucci for discovering these issues and providing a comprehensive write-up. Thank you to Yehuda Lindell for coordinating the disclosure.\nThanks to Jay Prakash for clarifying the risk of the base setup reuse.\nThanks to @cronokirby for writing the corrected code.","ecosystems":["Go"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Taurus multi-party-sig has OT-based ECDSA protocol implementation flaws","id":"GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"Go","product":null,"products":[],"type":"weak_cryptography","year":"2024"},"n_packages":3,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig","source":"GO-2024-3288"},{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":["0.7.0-alpha-2025-01-28"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253"},{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":["0.7.0-alpha-2025-01-28"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig","source":"GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253"}],"products":null,"published":"2024-11-25","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"Go Vulnerability Database","prefix":"GO"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"A malicious participant can recover secret shares in the Taurus multi-party-sig library by reusing OT setups, compromising cryptographic security.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253/"}