# GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v: The Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to creat

> Attackers with create permissions can exfiltrate secrets and execute arbitrary code by injecting malicious PodSpecs into Fission MessageQueueTriggers.

- **Severity:** Not scored
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Any signed-in user
- **Attackable:** Over the internet
- **Victim action needed:** Not needed
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 30 Jun 2026
- **Also known as:** GO-2026-5849

## What is GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v?

GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v is a vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission, published on 30 Jun 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.

### Official description

### Summary

The Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to create MQTs in a namespace.

### Details

**1. Secret materialization.** `getEnvVarlist` in `pkg/mqtrigger/scalermanager.go` read the Secret named in `Spec.Secret` using the controller's cluster-wide `secrets/get` RBAC and emitted each key as a literal `EnvVar.Value`, copying
the plaintext secret content into the connector Deployment's pod template. A subject holding `messagequeuetriggers/create` but **not** `secrets/get` could exfiltrate any Secret in the namespace by pointing an MQT at it.

**2. PodSpec injection.** `Spec.PodSpec` was merged into the controller-built connector PodSpec via `util.MergePodSpec` with no allowlist on which fields could come from the user. An MQT could substitute `Containers[].Image` (run any
image), override `Command`/`Args`, inject `Env`, add `VolumeMounts` + `Volumes`, override `ServiceAccountName`, and set `HostNetwork`/`HostPID`/`HostIPC` — turning `messagequeuetriggers/create` into effective `deployments/create` with an
 arbitrary image and service account.

### Impact

A tenant with only `messagequeuetriggers.fission.io/create` in a namespace could read any Secret in that namespace and run an arbitrary container image under an arbitrary service account, escalating well beyond their intended RBAC.

### Fix

Fixed in [#3367](https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3367) and released in [v1.24.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0).

- `getEnvVarlist` now emits `EnvVar.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef` so the connector pod resolves values at start time under its own service account. The secret values are never written into the Deployment object and never logged.
- A new allowlist, `MergeAllowedPodSpecFields` (`pkg/executor/util/merge_allowlist.go`), accepts only `NodeSelector`, `Tolerations`, `Affinity`, `RuntimeClassName`, and per-container `Resources`. All other user-supplied fields are
dropped at the controller layer, and the validating webhook rejects every populated non-allowlisted field with a clear error. The webhook and the merge helper share a single canonical `DisallowedPodSpecFields` enumeration so they cannot
drift.

### Behavioural change

MQT authors that previously overrode the connector image, command, args, env, volumes, service account, or host namespaces via `Spec.PodSpec` will see those fields rejected at admission (or silently dropped if the webhook is disabled).
Allowlisted fields flow through unchanged.

## Which versions are affected by GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v?

3 open source packages ship an affected version, including github.com/fission/fission.


| Package | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `github.com/fission/fission` | Go | All versions | 1.24.0 |
| `github.com/fission/fission` | Go | All versions | 1.24.0 |
| `github.com/fission/fission` | Go | All versions | 1.24.0 |

## How do I fix GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v?

Upgrade github.com/fission/fission to 1.24.0 or later.

## Is GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v in the wild and no public exploit code.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
Check this codebase for GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v and fix it if it is affected.

What it is: GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v is a vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission, published on 30 Jun 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v in the wild and no public exploit code.

Affected packages and fixed versions:
- github.com/fission/fission (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 1.24.0
- github.com/fission/fission (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 1.24.0
- github.com/fission/fission (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 1.24.0

Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.