{"answers":{"affected":"3 open source packages ship an affected version, including github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon to 1.1.0 or later.","what":"GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 is a vulnerability in github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon, published on 15 May 2025. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 is a vulnerability in github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon, published on 15 May 2025. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon (Go): affected all versions; no fix listed\n- github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 1.1.0\n- github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 1.1.0\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6/index.md)","id":"GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6/index.md","name":"GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6","record":{"aliases":["GO-2025-3686"],"analysis":{"component_type":"server_software","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["data_modify","denial_of_service"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Babylon blockchain protocol","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can replay signatures to inject invalid randomness commitments, disrupting finality provider operations in the Babylon protocol.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"other"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\n\nA high vulnerability exists in the Babylon protocol's x/finality module due to a lack of domain separation in signed messages, combined with insufficient validation in the MsgCommitPubRandList handler. Specifically, the handler does not enforce that the submitted Commitment field is 32 bytes long. This allows an attacker to replay a signature originally generated for a different message (e.g., a Proof-of-Possession in MsgCreateFinalityProvider) as a MsgCommitPubRandList. By crafting the message parameters, an attacker can use the typically 20-byte address bytes (from the PoP context) to form the StartHeight, NumPubRand, and a shorter-than-expected Commitment (e.g., 4 bytes). The replayed signature will pass verification for this crafted message, leading to the injection of an invalid PubRand commitment.\n\n### Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability, specifically via the PoP signature replay, allows an attacker to store an invalid PubRand commitment (with a non-standard length, e.g., 4 bytes) for a targeted Finality Provider (FP). Despite the commitment itself being malformed, it's the associated StartHeight and NumPubRand (derived from the replayed address bytes and typically very large) that cause severe consequences\n\n### Future recommendations\n\nTo minimize future risk of such attacks, all finality providers should:\n1.  Never re-use your finality provider EOTS across the networks (e.g., the testnet) or for any other purpose. \n2. Never use EOTS keys to sign any other data than relevant to in-protocol messages. Ideally EOTS key should only be used to:\n    - Sign initial proof of possession message\n    - Sign periodic randomness commits\n    - Sign finality votes with every block\n\n### Finder\nVulnerability discovered by:\n- Marco Hextor\n- https://x.com/marcohextor\n- @marcohextor","ecosystems":["Go"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Babylon Finality Provider `MsgCommitPubRandList` replay attack","id":"GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"Go","product":null,"products":[],"type":"other","year":"2025"},"n_packages":3,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon","source":"GO-2025-3686"},{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":["1.1.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6"},{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":["1.1.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon","source":"GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6"}],"products":null,"published":"2025-05-15","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"Go Vulnerability Database","prefix":"GO"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can replay signatures to inject invalid randomness commitments, disrupting finality provider operations in the Babylon protocol.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6/"}