{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including openclaw.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.26 or later.","what":"GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in openclaw, published on 3 Mar 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in openclaw, published on 3 Mar 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.2.26\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.2.26\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4/index.md)","id":"GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4/index.md","name":"GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Microsoft Teams integration","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"An SSRF vulnerability in OpenClaw's Microsoft Teams media handling allows attackers to bypass shared security guards and access internal resources.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"ssrf"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"## Impact\nMicrosoft Teams media handling used mixed fetch paths for Graph metadata/content and attachment auth-retry flows. Some paths bypassed the shared SSRF guard model and created inconsistent host/DNS enforcement across redirect/fetch hops.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.2.25`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.2.25`\n- Planned patched version for next release: `2026.2.26`\n\n## Technical Details\nThe Microsoft Teams attachment/media code previously relied on plugin-local fetch behavior in parts of the flow, instead of uniformly using shared guarded fetch logic with pinned DNS + policy checks. This could allow policy drift and SSRF boundary inconsistency between channel/plugin paths.\n\nThe fix unifies this path by:\n- routing Microsoft Teams Graph message/hosted-content/attachment fetches through shared SSRF-guarded fetch paths,\n- routing auth-scope fallback attachment downloads through the same guarded policy model,\n- centralizing hostname-suffix allowlist policy helpers in `plugin-sdk` so channel/plugins use the same allowlist normalization and policy construction behavior.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `57334cd7d85174d5f951de01114fd5801b063564`\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"OpenClaw: Microsoft Teams media fetch paths bypass shared SSRF guard model","id":"GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"ssrf","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.2.26"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.2.26"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":"pkg:npm/openclaw","source":"GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-03-03","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"An SSRF vulnerability in OpenClaw's Microsoft Teams media handling allows attackers to bypass shared security guards and access internal resources.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4/"}