{"answers":{"affected":"3 open source packages ship an affected version, including code.vikunja.io/api.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.6.0 or later.","what":"GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 is a vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api, published on 9 Oct 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 is a vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api, published on 9 Oct 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- code.vikunja.io/api (Go): affected all versions; no fix listed\n- code.vikunja.io/api (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 2.6.0\n- code.vikunja.io/api (Go): affected all versions; fixed in 2.6.0\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737/index.md)","id":"GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737/index.md","name":"GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737","record":{"aliases":["GO-2026-6723"],"analysis":{"component_type":"web_application","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["data_read"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Vikunja task manager","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Read-only project members can view assignee email addresses via the task assignees endpoint due to missing data obfuscation.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"information_disclosure"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\n`TaskAssginee.ReadAll` returns assignee user objects without blanking the `Email` field, disclosing assignee email addresses to any read-only project member. Every sibling path that returns user objects obfuscates the email; this one does not.\n\n### Details\n`pkg/models/task_assignees.go` (~lines 306-344) does `Select(\"users.*\")` and returns the result directly. `User.Email` is `json:\"email,omitempty\"`, so a non-empty value always serializes. The endpoint gates on `task.CanRead`, so a read-only member passes. Sibling paths blank the field: `pkg/models/tasks.go:530`, `pkg/models/project_users.go:216`, `pkg/models/teams.go:177`, `pkg/models/label_task.go:312`, `pkg/models/task_attachment.go:511`. The omission here reads as an oversight, not a decision.\n\nThe same file's `getRawTaskAssigneesForTasks` (~line 56) also selects `users.*` but is safe because its only caller (`addAssigneesToTasks`) blanks the email afterwards.\n\n### PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0, v1 and v2)\n```\nGET /api/v1/tasks/{id}/assignees   (reader with permission:0)\n-\u003e [{\"id\":37,\"username\":\"...\",\"email\":\"assignee+SECRET@example.test\", ...}]\n```\nSame leak on `GET /api/v2/tasks/{id}/assignees` (routes through the identical model method). Contrast: `GET /api/v1/projects/{id}/projectusers` and the project task-embed both return the same users with no email.\n\n### Impact\nDisclosure of assignees' email addresses to users who should only see usernames. Read-only.\n\n### Fix\nBlank `Email` on each returned user in `TaskAssginee.ReadAll` before returning, matching the sibling paths. Covers v1 and v2 at once.","ecosystems":["Go"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Vikunja: Assignee email addresses disclosed to read-only project members via the task assignees endpoint","id":"GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"Go","product":null,"products":[],"type":"information_disclosure","year":"2026"},"n_packages":3,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"code.vikunja.io/api","purl":"pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api","source":"GO-2026-6723"},{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":["2.6.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"code.vikunja.io/api","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737"},{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":["2.6.0"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"code.vikunja.io/api","purl":"pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api","source":"GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-10-09","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"},{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"Go Vulnerability Database","prefix":"GO"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Read-only project members can view assignee email addresses via the task assignees endpoint due to missing data obfuscation.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737/"}